Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756515Ab3JNMWD (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Oct 2013 08:22:03 -0400 Received: from numidia.opendz.org ([98.142.220.152]:51941 "EHLO numidia.opendz.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755914Ab3JNMWB (ORCPT ); Mon, 14 Oct 2013 08:22:01 -0400 Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2013 13:21:54 +0100 From: Djalal Harouni To: Ryan Mallon Cc: "Eric W. Biederman" , Joe Perches , Andrew Morton , eldad@fogrefinery.com, Jiri Kosina , jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com, Dan Rosenberg , Kees Cook , Alexander Viro , George Spelvin , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" Subject: Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK Message-ID: <20131014122154.GA7341@dztty> References: <1381356014.2050.28.camel@joe-AO722> <5255D2FD.6050705@gmail.com> <1381356861.2050.33.camel@joe-AO722> <5255D7D4.8050204@gmail.com> <1381358030.2050.36.camel@joe-AO722> <5255DBD8.30005@gmail.com> <1381360187.2050.44.camel@joe-AO722> <87pprck0q7.fsf@xmission.com> <52576E32.1050700@gmail.com> <20131014101706.GA5605@dztty> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20131014101706.GA5605@dztty> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3523 Lines: 80 On Mon, Oct 14, 2013 at 11:17:06AM +0100, Djalal Harouni wrote: > On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 02:19:14PM +1100, Ryan Mallon wrote: > > On 11/10/13 13:20, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > > Joe Perches writes: > > > > > >> Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read > > >> permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which > > >> use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time, > > >> but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid > > >> binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates > > >> permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be > > >> leaked. > > >> > > >> This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu > > >> 12.04: > > >> > > >> $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms > > >> 00000000 T startup_32 > > >> > > >> $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms > > >> pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000' > > >> > > >> This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other > > >> setuid binaries may leak more information. > > >> > > >> Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process > > >> having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the > > >> real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses > > >> %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user > > >> is unprivileged. > > >> > > >> Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also > > >> correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default. > > > > > > Sigh. This is all wrong. The only correct thing to test is > > > file->f_cred. Aka the capabilities of the program that opened the > > > file. > > > > > > Which means that the interface to %pK in the case of kptr_restrict is > > > broken as it has no way to be passed the information it needs to make > > > a sensible decision. > > > > Would it make sense to add a struct file * to struct seq_file and set > > that in seq_open? Then the capability check can be done against seq->file. > For the "add a struct file * to struct seq_file" and set it during > seq_open(), It was proposed by Linus, but Al Viro didn't like it: > https://lkml.org/lkml/2013/9/25/765 > > I'm not sure if this will work for you: you can make seq_file->private > cache some data, by calling single_open()... at ->open(), later check it > during read()... > > > As noted by Eric, I'll also go for the capability check at ->open(), if it > does not break some userspace. BTW the CAP_SYSLOG check should do the job > > Checks during read() are not sufficient, since the design allows passing > file descriptors and dup() stdin/stdout of suid-execve. > > > IMO: unprivileged code should not get that file descriptor, so ->open() > should fail. > If this will break userspace then allow open() and cache result for read() > > > Can you emulate the behaviour of kptr_restrict=1 ? If so: > 1) perform check during open() and cache data > 2) during read() check kptr_restrict==1 > check the cached value and if opener had CAP_SYSLOG if so: > print something like this: 00000000 T startup_32 Sorry, I mean if the opener didn't have CAP_SYSLOG -- Djalal Harouni http://opendz.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/