Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754765Ab3JQLbD (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Oct 2013 07:31:03 -0400 Received: from mga11.intel.com ([192.55.52.93]:45687 "EHLO mga11.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754321Ab3JQLbB (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Oct 2013 07:31:01 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.93,513,1378882800"; d="scan'208";a="418313628" Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 14:30:27 +0300 From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: James Morris Cc: Kees Cook , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions Message-ID: <20131017112806.GA5293@intel.com> References: <20130920203556.GA8726@www.outflux.net> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: Organization: Intel Finland Oy - BIC 0357606-4 - Westendinkatu 7, 02160 Espoo User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1251 Lines: 27 On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 07:02:17PM +1100, James Morris wrote: > This seems like a regression in terms of separating mechanism and policy. > > We have several access control systems available (SELinux, at least) which > can implement this functionality with existing mechanisms using dynamic > policy. > > I'm concerned about the long term architectural impact of a proliferation > of arbitrary hard-coded security policies in the kernel. I don't > understand the push in this direction, frankly. The biggest risk in LSM stacker is really to become backdoor for very product dilated kernel changes that are not accepted to the mainline kernel. I think having LSM stacker would be benefical but barrier should be set very high for "one-shot" modules. One big benefit that I see in LSM stacker is not at least directly security related. It would be perfect integration tool when you want for example provide Android run-time in an OS that uses AppArmor or SMACK as its security framework. /Jarkko -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/