Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762789Ab3JQVA0 (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Oct 2013 17:00:26 -0400 Received: from mail-ob0-f170.google.com ([209.85.214.170]:36103 "EHLO mail-ob0-f170.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1762371Ab3JQVAZ (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Oct 2013 17:00:25 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20131017112806.GA5293@intel.com> References: <20130920203556.GA8726@www.outflux.net> <20131017112806.GA5293@intel.com> Date: Thu, 17 Oct 2013 14:00:24 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: -j2eht7nHLNtC4qQqczXnGojm8s Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH] LSM: ModPin LSM for module loading restrictions From: Kees Cook To: Jarkko Sakkinen Cc: James Morris , LKML , James Morris , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1530 Lines: 36 On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 4:30 AM, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 07:02:17PM +1100, James Morris wrote: >> This seems like a regression in terms of separating mechanism and policy. >> >> We have several access control systems available (SELinux, at least) which >> can implement this functionality with existing mechanisms using dynamic >> policy. >> >> I'm concerned about the long term architectural impact of a proliferation >> of arbitrary hard-coded security policies in the kernel. I don't >> understand the push in this direction, frankly. > > The biggest risk in LSM stacker is really to become backdoor for very product > dilated kernel changes that are not accepted to the mainline kernel. I think > having LSM stacker would be benefical but barrier should be set very high > for "one-shot" modules. > > One big benefit that I see in LSM stacker is not at least directly security > related. It would be perfect integration tool when you want for example > provide Android run-time in an OS that uses AppArmor or SMACK as its security > framework. I think of stacking as a way to help people do quick prototyping of security changes without getting in the way of their distro's MAC. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/