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Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2014 08:34:21 +0100
From: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
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To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@linux.intel.com>
CC: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        Cong Ding <dinggnu@gmail.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>,
        Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
        Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>,
        Michael Davidson <md@google.com>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Wei Yongjun <yongjun_wei@trendmicro.com.cn>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] x86/kaslr for v3.14
References: <201401201647.s0KGlZdh004167@tazenda.hos.anvin.org>	<CAFLxGvxO1MPDDjEh3FU5Gv2-eb6zBJxYtTnKdABDTTpbMxxYAw@mail.gmail.com>	<52E5EFAF.3060609@linux.intel.com> <CAFLxGvxJ0A6hZ52RWffkg_zXXScyPn10P4HcKvdAXfE43h32Eg@mail.gmail.com> <52E60240.1010406@zytor.com>
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Am 27.01.2014 07:52, schrieb H. Peter Anvin:
> Of course, stack traces themselves contain that information, so one
> could argue that oops=panic is required in order for kASLR to provide
> any kind of security against root.  (oops=panic is probably a good idea
> in secure environments anyway...)

Now I understand your point.

/proc/<pid>/stack and a world-readable /boot also need to be disabled.
Deploying a secure kASLR is not easy, especially for end-user distros.

Maybe a CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE_I_MEAN_IT which disables various sources of
information leakage would help too. ;-)

Thanks,
//richard
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