Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Thu, 31 Oct 2002 23:36:01 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Thu, 31 Oct 2002 23:36:01 -0500 Received: from thunk.org ([140.239.227.29]:40327 "EHLO thunker.thunk.org") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id ; Thu, 31 Oct 2002 23:35:59 -0500 Date: Thu, 31 Oct 2002 23:41:53 -0500 From: "Theodore Ts'o" To: "Matthew J. Fanto" Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: The Ext3sj Filesystem Message-ID: <20021101044153.GB12031@think.thunk.org> Mail-Followup-To: Theodore Ts'o , "Matthew J. Fanto" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <200210301434.17901.mattf@mattjf.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <200210301434.17901.mattf@mattjf.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.3.28i Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1843 Lines: 38 On Wed, Oct 30, 2002 at 02:34:17PM -0500, Matthew J. Fanto wrote: > > I am annoucing the development of the ext3sj filesystem. Ext3sj is a > new encrypted filesystem based off ext3. Ext3sj is an improvement > over the current loopback solution because we do not in fact require > a loopback device. Encryption/decryption is transparent to the user, > so the only thing they will need to know is their key, and how to > mount a device. Couple of points here. First of all, have you considered trying to do this as a stacking filesystem? Talk to the Intermezzo and Luster folks; they've gotten quite good at stacking their value-added filesystem on top ext2/3. This avoids code duplication, since now you don't have to track bug fixes in the core ext2/3 code. It also enforces functional separation, and should your filesystem smaller and easier to maintain. It also means that you can potentially use your code to provide crypto services to other filesystems besides just ext3. Secondly, the really critical question is key management. What happens if the user gets the key wrong? Will he/she know? Or will they just get garbage if the read from the file, and be able to trash the file if they write to the file with the incorrect key? Using some kind of key-ID and some way of validating that the key is correct before the user does start accessing files would probably be a really good idea. Finally, if you do want to allocate some additional fields in the ext2 inode, superblock, etc., please coordinate with me, so we can avoid conflicts as much as possible. Thanks!! - Ted - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/