Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753014AbaBJQ5d (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Feb 2014 11:57:33 -0500 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:63047 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751970AbaBJQ5c (ORCPT ); Mon, 10 Feb 2014 11:57:32 -0500 Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2014 17:57:23 +0100 From: Oleg Nesterov To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen , Steve Grubb , Eric Paris Subject: Re: [PATCH v3] audit: Turn off TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT when there are no rules Message-ID: <20140210165723.GA10856@redhat.com> References: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.18 (2008-05-17) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 02/08, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > > +void audit_inc_n_rules() > +{ > + struct task_struct *p, *t; > + > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > + audit_n_rules++; > + smp_wmb(); > + if (audit_n_rules == 1) { > + /* > + * We now have a rule; we need to hook syscall entry. > + */ > + for_each_process_thread(p, t) { > + if (t->audit_context) > + set_tsk_thread_flag(t, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); > + } > + } > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > +} > + > +void audit_dec_n_rules() > +{ > + read_lock(&tasklist_lock); > + --audit_n_rules; > + BUG_ON(audit_n_rules < 0); > + > + /* > + * If audit_n_rules == 0, then __audit_syscall_exit will clear > + * TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT. > + */ > + > + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock); > +} To be honest, I do not understand why _dec_ takes tasklist_lock... And why _inc_ increments audit_n_rules under tasklist. > @@ -1528,6 +1562,25 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code) > context->filterkey = NULL; > } > tsk->audit_context = context; > + > + if (ACCESS_ONCE(audit_n_rules) == 0) { > + /* > + * Either this is the very first syscall by this process or > + * audit_dec_n_rules recently set audit_n_rules to zero. > + */ > + smp_rmb(); rmb() looks wrong, we need mb() to serialize ACCESS_ONCE() and clear_tsk_thread_flag(). But, otoh, I think we do not need any barrier at all, we can rely on control dependency. See the recent 18c03c61444a21 "Documentation/ memory-barriers.txt: Prohibit speculative writes". > + /* audit_inc_n_rules could increment audit_n_rules here... */ > + > + clear_tsk_thread_flag(tsk, TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT); > + > + smp_rmb(); Again, I guess this should be mb() or smp_mb__after_clear_bit(). And I still think this needs more changes. Once again, I do not think that, say, __audit_log_bprm_fcaps() should populate context->aux if !TIF_SYSCALL_AUDIT, this list can grow indefinitely. Or __audit_signal_info()... Perhaps __audit_syscall_exit() should also set context->dummy? Oleg. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/