Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934058AbaDIQM2 (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Apr 2014 12:12:28 -0400 Received: from mail-oa0-f45.google.com ([209.85.219.45]:60841 "EHLO mail-oa0-f45.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933811AbaDIQML (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Apr 2014 12:12:11 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20140409090204.GA6583@linaro.org> References: <1396926910-11227-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <1396926910-11227-3-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> <20140409090204.GA6583@linaro.org> Date: Wed, 9 Apr 2014 09:12:10 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: K1uDEaoPoPJRlOqGGQ_GK-VdhSU Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 2/2] ARM: mm: allow text and rodata sections to be read-only From: Kees Cook To: Steve Capper Cc: "linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org" , Russell King , Catalin Marinas , Laura Abbott , Will Deacon , LKML , Rabin Vincent , Alexander Holler Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 2:02 AM, Steve Capper wrote: > Hi Kees, > > On Mon, Apr 07, 2014 at 08:15:10PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> This introduces CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA, making kernel text and rodata >> read-only. Additionally, this splits rodata from text so that rodata can >> also be NX, which may lead to wasted memory when aligning to SECTION_SIZE. >> >> The read-only areas are made writable during ftrace updates. Additional >> work is needed for kprobes and kexec, so the feature is temporarily >> marked as unavailable in Kconfig when those options are selected. >> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook >> --- >> arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 9 ++++++++ >> arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c | 17 ++++++++++++++ >> arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 3 +++ >> arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 12 ++++++++++ >> arch/arm/mm/init.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> 5 files changed, 87 insertions(+) >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h >> index 8b8b61685a34..b6fea0a1a88b 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h >> +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/cacheflush.h >> @@ -487,4 +487,13 @@ int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages); >> int set_memory_x(unsigned long addr, int numpages); >> int set_memory_nx(unsigned long addr, int numpages); >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA >> +void mark_rodata_ro(void); >> +void set_kernel_text_rw(void); >> +void set_kernel_text_ro(void); >> +#else >> +static inline void set_kernel_text_rw(void) { } >> +static inline void set_kernel_text_ro(void) { } >> +#endif >> + >> #endif >> diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c >> index af9a8a927a4e..ea446ae09c89 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c >> +++ b/arch/arm/kernel/ftrace.c >> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ >> #include >> #include >> #include >> +#include >> >> #include >> #include >> @@ -35,6 +36,22 @@ >> >> #define OLD_NOP 0xe1a00000 /* mov r0, r0 */ >> >> +static int __ftrace_modify_code(void *data) >> +{ >> + int *command = data; >> + >> + set_kernel_text_rw(); >> + ftrace_modify_all_code(*command); >> + set_kernel_text_ro(); >> + >> + return 0; >> +} > > Would another approach be to keep all the kernel .text ro then override > probe_kernel_write (which has a weak reference), to create a separate > temporary rw mapping to the specific page that needs to be modified? > > That way you only worry about TLB and cache maintenance for a smaller > area. Also, your kernel .text VAs never actually become writable, so > you don't need to worry as much about unauthorised changes whilst your > guard is temporarily down. > > (Though lots of small changes could probably make this more > expensive, and you will need to double check aliasing in pre-ARMv7). As I understand it, early boot needs some of these areas RWX. Doing the protection during init-free means we can avoid all that and still allow the memory to get reclaimed. As to not doing section re-mappings, I share the same concern about it being very expensive to do lots of small changes. As such, I think this is the cleanest approach that is still portable. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/