Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id ; Mon, 11 Nov 2002 05:13:59 -0500 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id ; Mon, 11 Nov 2002 05:13:59 -0500 Received: from relay01.rabobank.nl ([145.72.69.20]:55569 "HELO relay01.rabobank.nl") by vger.kernel.org with SMTP id ; Mon, 11 Nov 2002 05:13:58 -0500 X-Server-Uuid: d32dbd14-b86d-11d3-8c8e-0008c7bba343 X-Server-Uuid: 91077152-1bde-4e67-8480-731f07dac000 From: "Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)" To: "Tomas Szepe" , "Heusden van, FJJ (Folkert)" cc: "Roy Sigurd Karlsbakk" , "Linux Kernel Development" Subject: RE: random PID patch Date: Mon, 11 Nov 2002 11:20:39 +0100 MIME-Version: 1.0 X-WSS-ID: 11D18CF11074110-971-02 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Message-ID: <11D18CF11074110-971@_rabobank.nl_> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1685 Lines: 35 > Sometimes, (well; frequently) programs that create temporary > files let the filename depend on their PID. A hacker could use > that knowledge. So if you know that the application that > you're starting uses the last PID+1, you could make sure that > that file already exists or create a symlink with that name or > whatsoever causing the application you're starting to do > things it's not supposed to. Like forcing suid apps to create > a file in the startup-scripts dir. or something. TS> How about I create 2^15 symlinks then? TS> Really, the only true solution to this problem is to fix the apps. True. But until ALL applications are fixed and until this bug is no longer written, this patch can help... I agree, though, that it should not be implemented in the main- kernel. Still, it can be usefull. ================================================ De informatie opgenomen in dit bericht kan vertrouwelijk zijn en is uitsluitend bestemd voor de geadresseerde. Indien u dit bericht onterecht ontvangt, wordt u verzocht de inhoud niet te gebruiken en de afzender direct te informeren door het bericht te retourneren. ================================================ The information contained in this message may be confidential and is intended to be exclusively for the addressee. Should you receive this message unintentionally, please do not use the contents herein and notify the sender immediately by return e-mail. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/