Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755524AbaDPSZ5 (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Apr 2014 14:25:57 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:60579 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755263AbaDPSZf (ORCPT ); Wed, 16 Apr 2014 14:25:35 -0400 Date: Wed, 16 Apr 2014 14:25:30 -0400 From: Vivek Goyal To: Andy Lutomirski Cc: Simo Sorce , David Miller , Tejun Heo , Daniel Walsh , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , lpoetter@redhat.com, cgroups@vger.kernel.org, kay@redhat.com, Network Development Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] net: Implement SO_PASSCGROUP to enable passing cgroup path Message-ID: <20140416182530.GB550@redhat.com> References: <20140416002010.GA5035@redhat.com> <20140416.085743.1614257692560892039.davem@davemloft.net> <1397664837.19767.410.camel@willson.li.ssimo.org> <20140416180642.GG31074@redhat.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 11:13:31AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: [..] > > Ok, so passing cgroup information is not necessarily a problem as long > > as it is not used for authentication. So say somebody is just logging > > all the client request and which cgroup client was in, that should not > > be a problem. > > Do you consider correct attribution of logging messages to be > important? If so, then this is a kind of authentication, albeit one > where the impact of screwing it up is a bit lower. So not passing cgroup information makes attribution more correct. Just logging of information is authentication how? Both kernel and user space log message into /var/log/messages and kernel messages are prefixed with "kernel". So this somehow becomes are sort of authentication. I don't get it. > > > > > I agree that before somebody uses cgroup information for authentication > > purposes, may be there needs to be a bigger debate whether this info > > can be used safely for authentication purposes or not and in what > > circumstances it is safe to use for authentication. > > I thought that the original intended user of these patches was SSSD. > I have no idea what SSSD wanted them for, but I think it may better. SSSD wanted to use this information too. And I think this is a good time to revisit and discuss can cgroup information be used safely for authentication or not. > > > > > But that does not mean that API to pass the cgroup information around is > > wrong. > > > > It may not be wrong, but it might be extremely difficult or impossible > to use it safely. I think that's something to avoid. Atleast I can't see a problem with logging example yet. Thanks Vivek -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/