Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756526AbaDWD6B (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Apr 2014 23:58:01 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:18138 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753517AbaDWD57 (ORCPT ); Tue, 22 Apr 2014 23:57:59 -0400 Message-ID: <1398225475.750.7.camel@localhost> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald From: Eric Paris To: Steve Grubb Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , linux-audit@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, jamal@mojatatu.com Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2014 23:57:55 -0400 In-Reply-To: <26389161.vp9iWSVLPX@x2> References: <20140422.161904.1187535812839850973.davem@davemloft.net> <26389161.vp9iWSVLPX@x2> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2014-04-22 at 22:25 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote: > On Tuesday, April 22, 2014 09:31:52 PM Richard Guy Briggs wrote: > > This is a patch set Eric Paris and I have been working on to add a > > restricted capability read-only netlink multicast socket to kernel audit to > > enable userspace clients such as systemd/journald to receive audit logs, in > > addition to the bidirectional auditd userspace client. > > Do have the ability to separate of secadm_r and sysadm_r? By allowing this, we > will leak to a sysadmin that he is being audited by the security officer. In a > lot of cases, they are one in the same person. But for others, they are not. I > have a feeling this will cause problems for MLS systems. Why? This requires CAP_AUDIT_READ. Just don't give CAP_AUDIT_READ to places you don't want to have read permission. Exactly the same as you don't give CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r. (If we are giving CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL to sysadm_r and you think that any file protections on /var/log/audit/audit.log are adequate we are fooling ourselves!) > Also, shouldn't we have an audit event for every attempt to connect to this > socket? We really need to know where this information is getting leaked to. We certainly can. What would you like to see in that event? -Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/