Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752385AbaFJMwi (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 08:52:38 -0400 Received: from e37.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.158]:58593 "EHLO e37.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751888AbaFJMwg (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 08:52:36 -0400 Message-ID: <1402404750.5350.7.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin keys only From: Mimi Zohar To: Josh Boyer Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin , dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 08:52:30 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20140610122008.GA31944@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> References: <1402331614.7064.60.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> <20140610122008.GA31944@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.6.4 (3.6.4-3.fc18) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 14061012-7164-0000-0000-00000258B3CD Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 08:20 -0400, Josh Boyer wrote: > On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:48:14AM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: > > Also I want to discuss here Fedora UEFI patches as they are the reason for > > the these original patchset. > > > > http://pkgs.fedoraproject.org/cgit/kernel.git/tree/modsign-uefi.patch > > > > They provide functionality to specify MokIgnoreDb variable to limit loading of > > UEFI keys only from MOK List, while ignoring DB. This is certainly a good > > functionality. But once MODULE_SIG_UEFI is enabled, it looks there is no way > > to prevent loading keys from UEFI at all. And this might not be a good default > > functionality. Someone might want not allow loading of keys from UEFI unless > > kernel parameter is specified to allow it without recompiling the kernel > > and disabling MODULE_SIG_UEFI. > > > > Josh, why such design decision was made? > > IIRC, it's because kernel parameters can be added programmatically from a > remote user if they gain root access. Having a kernel parameter to > disable a key piece of secure boot isn't all that great. We disable > other kernel parameters like acpi_rspd as well. In this case, there shouldn't be a problem as the kernel parameters would further limit the keys usage. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/