Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933853AbaFJUki (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:40:38 -0400 Received: from cavan.codon.org.uk ([93.93.128.6]:47196 "EHLO cavan.codon.org.uk" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S933803AbaFJUke (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 16:40:34 -0400 Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 21:40:21 +0100 From: Matthew Garrett To: Dmitry Kasatkin Cc: Josh Boyer , David Howells , Mimi Zohar , Dmitry Kasatkin , keyrings@linux-nfs.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin keys only Message-ID: <20140610204021.GA8916@srcf.ucam.org> References: <1402331614.7064.60.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> <20140610122008.GA31944@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: mjg59@cavan.codon.org.uk X-SA-Exim-Scanned: No (on cavan.codon.org.uk); SAEximRunCond expanded to false Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 11:34:17PM +0300, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote: > Preventing loading keys from uefi except dbx by default actually improves > security. Adding kernel parameter to read db we make system more > vulnerable. It only adds security if you're performing a measured boot and remote attestation. Otherwise you implicitly trust that key anyway. In almost all cases refusing to trust db gives you a false sense of security without any real improvement. I don't think it's obvious it should be the default. -- Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/