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Date: Wed, 11 Jun 2014 03:22:22 +0100
From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin keys
 only
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On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 09:24:53PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 22:40 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: 
> > The hole is that the system trusts keys that you don't trust. The 
> > appropriate thing to do is to remove that trust from the entire system, 
> > not just one layer of the system. If people gain the impression that 
> > they can simply pass a kernel parameter and avoid trusting the vendor 
> > keys, they'll be upset to discover that it's easily circumvented.
> 
> Assuming I remove all the keys I don't trust, there are still keys that
> are trusted while booting, but are not necessary afterwards.  We should
> be able to limit the scope of where and when keys are trusted.

Providing a userspace mechanism for selectively dropping keys from the 
kernel seems like a good thing?

-- 
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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