Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754895AbaFKDIZ (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:25 -0400 Received: from e32.co.us.ibm.com ([32.97.110.150]:60699 "EHLO e32.co.us.ibm.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751619AbaFKDIX (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:23 -0400 Message-ID: <1402456095.612.32.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] KEYS: validate key trust with owner and builtin keys only From: Mimi Zohar To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin , Josh Boyer , David Howells , Dmitry Kasatkin , keyrings , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , linux-security-module Date: Tue, 10 Jun 2014 23:08:15 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20140611022222.GA2349@srcf.ucam.org> References: <20140610122008.GA31944@hansolo.jdub.homelinux.org> <20140610204021.GA8916@srcf.ucam.org> <20140610212516.GB10614@srcf.ucam.org> <20140610214038.GA13881@srcf.ucam.org> <1402449893.612.14.camel@dhcp-9-2-203-236.watson.ibm.com> <20140611022222.GA2349@srcf.ucam.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.6.4 (3.6.4-3.fc18) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-MML: disable X-Content-Scanned: Fidelis XPS MAILER x-cbid: 14061103-0928-0000-0000-0000029D8E73 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, 2014-06-11 at 03:22 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Tue, Jun 10, 2014 at 09:24:53PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > On Tue, 2014-06-10 at 22:40 +0100, Matthew Garrett wrote: > > > The hole is that the system trusts keys that you don't trust. The > > > appropriate thing to do is to remove that trust from the entire system, > > > not just one layer of the system. If people gain the impression that > > > they can simply pass a kernel parameter and avoid trusting the vendor > > > keys, they'll be upset to discover that it's easily circumvented. > > > > Assuming I remove all the keys I don't trust, there are still keys that > > are trusted while booting, but are not necessary afterwards. We should > > be able to limit the scope of where and when keys are trusted. > > Providing a userspace mechanism for selectively dropping keys from the > kernel seems like a good thing? No, patch "KEYS: verify a certificate is signed by a 'trusted' key" adds signed public keys. Mimi -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/