Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754561AbaGQU1M (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:27:12 -0400 Received: from mail-pd0-f181.google.com ([209.85.192.181]:52363 "EHLO mail-pd0-f181.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753480AbaGQU1K (ORCPT ); Thu, 17 Jul 2014 16:27:10 -0400 Message-ID: <53C8319A.8090108@amacapital.net> Date: Thu, 17 Jul 2014 13:27:06 -0700 From: Andy Lutomirski User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: "Theodore Ts'o" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org CC: linux-abi@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, beck@openbsd.org Subject: Re: [PATCH, RFC] random: introduce getrandom(2) system call References: <1405588695-12014-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> In-Reply-To: <1405588695-12014-1-git-send-email-tytso@mit.edu> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 07/17/2014 02:18 AM, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > The getrandom(2) system call was requested by the LibreSSL Portable > developers. It is analoguous to the getentropy(2) system call in > OpenBSD. > > The rationale of this system call is to provide resiliance against > file descriptor exhaustion attacks, where the attacker consumes all > available file descriptors, forcing the use of the fallback code where > /dev/[u]random is not available. Since the fallback code is often not > well-tested, it is better to eliminate this potential failure mode > entirely. > > The other feature provided by this new system call is the ability to > request randomness from the /dev/urandom entropy pool, but to block > until at least 128 bits of entropy has been accumulated in the > /dev/urandom entropy pool. Historically, the emphasis in the > /dev/urandom development has been to ensure that urandom pool is > initialized as quickly as possible after system boot, and preferably > before the init scripts start execution. This is because changing > /dev/urandom reads to block represents an interface change that could > potentially break userspace which is not acceptable. In practice, on > most x86 desktop and server systems, in general the entropy pool can > be initialized before it is needed (and in modern kernels, we will > printk a warning message if not). However, on an embedded system, > this may not be hte case. And so with a new interface, we can provide > this requested functionality of blocking until the urandom pool has > been initialized. Any userspace program which uses this new > functionality must make sure that if it is used in early boot, that it > will not cause the boot up scripts or other portions of the system > startup to hang indefinitely. > > SYNOPSIS > #include > > int getrandom(void *buf, size_t buflen, unsigned int flags); > > DESCRIPTION > > The system call getrandom() fills the buffer pointed to by buf > with up to buflen random bytes which can be used to seed user > space random number generators (i.e., DRBG's) or for other > cryptographic processes. It should not be used Monte Carlo > simulations or for other probabilistic sampling applications. > > If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is set, then draw from the > /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom pool. The > /dev/random pool is limited based on the entropy that can be > obtained from environmental noise, so if there is insufficient > entropy, the requested number of bytes may not be returned. > If there is no entropy available at all, getrandom(2) will > either return an error with errno set to EAGAIN, or block if > the GRND_BLOCK flags bit is set. > > If the GRND_RANDOM flags bit is not set, then the /dev/raundom > pool will be used. Unlike reading from the /dev/urandom, if > the urandom pool has not been sufficiently initialized, > getrandom(2) will either return an error with errno set to > EGAIN, or block if the GRND_BLOCK flags bit is set. > > RETURN VALUE > On success, the number of bytes that was returned is returned. > > On error, -1 is returned, and errno is set appropriately > > ERRORS > EINVAL The buflen value was invalid. > > EFAULT buf is outside your accessible address space. > > EAGAIN The requested entropy was not available, and the > getentropy(2) would have blocked if GRND_BLOCK flag > was set. > > Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o > --- > arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl | 1 + > arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | 1 + > drivers/char/random.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > include/linux/syscalls.h | 3 +++ > include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h | 4 +++- > include/uapi/linux/random.h | 9 +++++++++ > 6 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl > index d6b8679..f484e39 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl > +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_32.tbl > @@ -360,3 +360,4 @@ > 351 i386 sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr > 352 i386 sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr > 353 i386 renameat2 sys_renameat2 > +354 i386 getrandom sys_getrandom > diff --git a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl > index ec255a1..6705032 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl > +++ b/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl > @@ -323,6 +323,7 @@ > 314 common sched_setattr sys_sched_setattr > 315 common sched_getattr sys_sched_getattr > 316 common renameat2 sys_renameat2 > +317 common getrandom sys_getrandom > > # > # x32-specific system call numbers start at 512 to avoid cache impact > diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c > index aa22fe5..76a56f6 100644 > --- a/drivers/char/random.c > +++ b/drivers/char/random.c > @@ -258,6 +258,8 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > +#include > > #include > #include > @@ -469,6 +471,8 @@ static struct entropy_store nonblocking_pool = { > push_to_pool), > }; > > +DECLARE_COMPLETION(urandom_initialized); > + > static __u32 const twist_table[8] = { > 0x00000000, 0x3b6e20c8, 0x76dc4190, 0x4db26158, > 0xedb88320, 0xd6d6a3e8, 0x9b64c2b0, 0xa00ae278 }; > @@ -657,6 +661,7 @@ retry: > r->entropy_total = 0; > if (r == &nonblocking_pool) { > prandom_reseed_late(); > + complete_all(&urandom_initialized); > pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n", r->name); > } > } > @@ -1355,7 +1360,7 @@ static int arch_random_refill(void) > } > > static ssize_t > -random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > +_random_read(int nonblock, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes) > { > ssize_t n; > > @@ -1379,7 +1384,7 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > if (arch_random_refill()) > continue; > > - if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) > + if (nonblock) > return -EAGAIN; > > wait_event_interruptible(random_read_wait, > @@ -1391,6 +1396,12 @@ random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > } > > static ssize_t > +random_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > +{ > + return _random_read(file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK, buf, nbytes); > +} > + > +static ssize_t > urandom_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t nbytes, loff_t *ppos) > { > int ret; > @@ -1533,6 +1544,26 @@ const struct file_operations urandom_fops = { > .llseek = noop_llseek, > }; > > +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(getrandom, char __user *, buf, size_t, count, > + unsigned int, flags) > +{ > + int r; > + As previously noted, this needs to validate flags. > + if (count > 256) > + return -EINVAL; I think I'd rather see this allow any length, at least when using urandom. > + > + if (flags & GRND_RANDOM) { > + return _random_read(!(flags & GRND_BLOCK), buf, count); > + } > + if (flags & GRND_BLOCK) { > + r = wait_for_completion_interruptible(&urandom_initialized); > + if (r) > + return r; > + } else if (!completion_done(&urandom_initialized)) > + return -EAGAIN; > + return urandom_read(NULL, buf, count, NULL); This can return -ERESTARTSYS. Does it need any logic to restart correctly? I don't think it's possible for the urandom case to succeed without filling the buffer. If that's true, can we document it and add a corresponding BUG_ON/WARN_ON in the syscall implementation? --Andy > +/* > + * Flags for getrandom(2) > + * > + * GAND_BLOCK Allow getrandom(2) to block > + * GAND_RANDOM Use the /dev/random pool instead of /dev/urandom GRND? > + */ > +#define GRND_BLOCK 0x0001 > +#define GRND_RANDOM 0x0002 > + > #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_RANDOM_H */ > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/