Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752469AbaGTMIX (ORCPT ); Sun, 20 Jul 2014 08:08:23 -0400 Received: from a.ns.miles-group.at ([95.130.255.143]:65276 "EHLO radon.swed.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752170AbaGTMIV (ORCPT ); Sun, 20 Jul 2014 08:08:21 -0400 Message-ID: <53CBB095.6010705@nod.at> Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 14:05:41 +0200 From: Richard Weinberger User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Andreas Schwab CC: Joakim Tjernlund , LKML Subject: Re: ls -l /proc/1/exe -> Permission denied References: <87lhrpayl4.fsf@igel.home> <87fvhwxps6.fsf@igel.home> <87bnskxn7g.fsf@igel.home> In-Reply-To: <87bnskxn7g.fsf@igel.home> X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Am 20.07.2014 13:51, schrieb Andreas Schwab: > Richard Weinberger writes: >> Do you have an example? > > proc symlinks are special because they actually resolve to the inode. Ah. If an attacker manages the kernel to follow the symlink he could indirectly access that file. Thanks for pointing this out! Thanks, //richard -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/