Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753620AbaGTUAH (ORCPT ); Sun, 20 Jul 2014 16:00:07 -0400 Received: from a.ns.miles-group.at ([95.130.255.143]:65275 "EHLO radon.swed.at" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753010AbaGTUAG (ORCPT ); Sun, 20 Jul 2014 16:00:06 -0400 Message-ID: <53CC1FC2.5000806@nod.at> Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 22:00:02 +0200 From: Richard Weinberger User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:24.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/24.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Joakim Tjernlund CC: LKML , Andreas Schwab Subject: Re: ls -l /proc/1/exe -> Permission denied References: <87lhrpayl4.fsf@igel.home> <87fvhwxps6.fsf@igel.home> <87bnskxn7g.fsf@igel.home> <53CBB095.6010705@nod.at> In-Reply-To: X-Enigmail-Version: 1.6 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Am 20.07.2014 21:15, schrieb Joakim Tjernlund: > Richard Weinberger wrote on 2014/07/20 14:05:41: >> >> Am 20.07.2014 13:51, schrieb Andreas Schwab: >>> Richard Weinberger writes: >>>> Do you have an example? >>> >>> proc symlinks are special because they actually resolve to the inode. >> >> Ah. If an attacker manages the kernel to follow the symlink he could >> indirectly access that file. >> Thanks for pointing this out! > > That is a big if, I read this as you don't trust the kernels impl. > of proc sym links so paper over this with denying all other to read > trivial > data such as the exe sym link. Feel free to propose a solution for that. :-) Thanks, //richard -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/