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Date: Thu, 2 Oct 2014 21:32:30 +0300
Message-ID: <CACE9dm8ZmVJe7qadrLwXEQHYrmau_Mbahnz4FSBaWD4GB==JMw@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 08/13] KEYS: Overhaul key identification when searching
 for asymmetric keys
From: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
To: Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>, Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>,
        keyrings <keyrings@linux-nfs.org>, Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com>,
        "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        pjones@redhat.com, Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com>
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On 2 October 2014 19:04, Dmitry Kasatkin <d.kasatkin@samsung.com> wrote:
> On 02/10/14 18:49, Dmitry Kasatkin wrote:
>> Hi David,
>>
>> I just took latest #next branch from James's security tree which
>> includes latest KEYs patches and noticed following:
>>
>> [    9.812332] Request for unknown module key 'Magrathea: Glacier
>> signing key: 926305d6dda66f47139eb4e3cb25a6adef527f08' err -11
>>
>> Also I noticed that output of 'keyctl show' and 'cat /proc/keys' output
>> also has changed in respect of certificate ids..
>>
>> Those ids does not look any close to my kernel X509 X509v3 Subject Key
>> Identifier, which is:
>> 92:63:05:D6:DD:A6:6F:47:13:9E:B4:E3:CB:25:A6:AD:EF:52:7F:08
>>
>> proc/keys shows
>>
>> symmetri Magrathea: Glacier signing key: d9e2e4c6951f1e83: X509.RSA
>> 6865612e68326732 []
>>


Ok.. d9e2e4c6951f1e83 is serial number.

What is this 6865612e68326732?

Does it still support searching for the key by partially matching
Subject Key Identifier?


- Dmitry

>> Very different ids..
>>
>> How could I match certificate now?
>> Module verification code cannot find needed key..
>>
>> - Dmitry
>
>
> Hehe. Also now I get kernel Oops in asymmetric_key_id_same...
>
> -------------------------
> [  132.816522] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at
> ffffffffffffffea
> [  132.819902] IP: [<ffffffff812bfc20>] asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [  132.820302] PGD 1a12067 PUD 1a14067 PMD 0
> [  132.820302] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP
> [  132.820302] Modules linked in: bridge(E) stp(E) llc(E) evdev(E)
> serio_raw(E) i2c_piix4(E) button(E) fuse(E)
> [  132.820302] CPU: 0 PID: 2993 Comm: cat Tainted: G            E
> 3.16.0-kds+ #2847
> [  132.820302] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
> [  132.820302] task: ffff88004249a430 ti: ffff880056640000 task.ti:
> ffff880056640000
> [  132.820302] RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff812bfc20>]  [<ffffffff812bfc20>]
> asymmetric_key_id_same+0x14/0x36
> [  132.820302] RSP: 0018:ffff880056643930  EFLAGS: 00010246
> [  132.820302] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffffffffffea RCX:
> ffff880056643ae0
> [  132.820302] RDX: 000000000000005e RSI: ffffffffffffffea RDI:
> ffff88005bac9300
> [  132.820302] RBP: ffff880056643948 R08: 0000000000000003 R09:
> 00000007504aa01a
> [  132.820302] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12:
> ffff88005d68ca40
> [  132.820302] R13: 0000000000000101 R14: 0000000000000000 R15:
> ffff88005bac5280
> [  132.820302] FS:  00007f67a153c740(0000) GS:ffff88005da00000(0000)
> knlGS:0000000000000000
> [  132.820302] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003b
> [  132.820302] CR2: ffffffffffffffea CR3: 000000002e663000 CR4:
> 00000000000006f0
> [  132.820302] Stack:
> [  132.820302]  ffffffff812bfc66 ffff880056643ae0 ffff88005bac5280
> ffff880056643958
> [  132.820302]  ffffffff812bfc9d ffff880056643980 ffffffff812971d9
> ffff88005ce930c1
> [  132.820302]  ffff88005ce930c0 0000000000000000 ffff8800566439c8
> ffffffff812fb753
> [  132.820302] Call Trace:
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc66>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x24/0x42
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc9d>] asymmetric_key_cmp+0x19/0x1b
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812971d9>] keyring_search_iterator+0x74/0xd7
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812fb753>] assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x67/0xd2
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812fbaa1>] assoc_array_iterate+0x19/0x1e
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297332>] search_nested_keyrings+0xf6/0x2b6
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810728da>] ? sched_clock_cpu+0x91/0xa2
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810860d2>] ? mark_held_locks+0x58/0x6e
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff810a137d>] ? current_kernel_time+0x77/0xb8
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297871>] keyring_search_aux+0xe1/0x14c
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812977fc>] ? keyring_search_aux+0x6c/0x14c
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff8129796b>] keyring_search+0x8f/0xb6
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812bfc84>] ? asymmetric_match_key_ids+0x42/0x42
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81297165>] ? key_default_cmp+0x20/0x20
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ab9e3>] asymmetric_verify+0xa4/0x214
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ab90e>] integrity_digsig_verify+0xb1/0xe2
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812abe41>] ? evm_verifyxattr+0x6a/0x7a
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812b0390>] ima_appraise_measurement+0x160/0x370
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff81161db2>] ? d_absolute_path+0x5b/0x7a
> [  132.820302]  [<ffffffff812ada30>] process_measurement+0x322/0x404
>
>
>> On 08/09/14 18:38, David Howells wrote:
>>> Make use of the new match string preparsing to overhaul key identification
>>> when searching for asymmetric keys.  The following changes are made:
>>>
>>>  (1) Use the previously created asymmetric_key_id struct to hold the following
>>>      key IDs derived from the X.509 certificate or PKCS#7 message:
>>>
>>>      id: serial number + issuer
>>>      skid: subjKeyId + subject
>>>      authority: authKeyId + issuer
>>>
>>>  (2) Replace the hex fingerprint attached to key->type_data[1] with an
>>>      asymmetric_key_ids struct containing the id and the skid (if present).
>>>
>>>  (3) Make the asymmetric_type match data preparse select one of two searches:
>>>
>>>      (a) An iterative search for the key ID given if prefixed with "id:".  The
>>>               prefix is expected to be followed by a hex string giving the ID to
>>>               search for.  The criterion key ID is checked against all key IDs
>>>               recorded on the key.
>>>
>>>      (b) A direct search if the key ID is not prefixed with "id:".  This will
>>>               look for an exact match on the key description.
>>>
>>>  (4) Make x509_request_asymmetric_key() take a key ID.  This is then converted
>>>      into "id:<hex>" and passed into keyring_search() where match preparsing
>>>      will turn it back into a binary ID.
>>>
>>>  (5) X.509 certificate verification then takes the authority key ID and looks
>>>      up a key that matches it to find the public key for the certificate
>>>      signature.
>>>
>>>  (6) PKCS#7 certificate verification then takes the id key ID and looks up a
>>>      key that matches it to find the public key for the signed information
>>>      block signature.
>>>
>>> Additional changes:
>>>
>>>  (1) Multiple subjKeyId and authKeyId values on an X.509 certificate cause the
>>>      cert to be rejected with -EBADMSG.
>>>
>>>  (2) The 'fingerprint' ID is gone.  This was primarily intended to convey PGP
>>>      public key fingerprints.  If PGP is supported in future, this should
>>>      generate a key ID that carries the fingerprint.
>>>
>>>  (3) Th ca_keyid= kernel command line option is now converted to a key ID and
>>>      used to match the authority key ID.  Possibly this should only match the
>>>      actual authKeyId part and not the issuer as well.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h  |    4 -
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c  |  133 ++++++++++++-----------------
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c     |   38 ++++++--
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h     |    5 -
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c      |    6 -
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c     |   44 ++++------
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c |   55 +++++++-----
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h      |    5 +
>>>  crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c  |   89 +++++++++++--------
>>>  include/crypto/public_key.h               |    5 +
>>>  10 files changed, 198 insertions(+), 186 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> index 917be6b985e7..fd21ac28e0a0 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_keys.h
>>> @@ -9,13 +9,13 @@
>>>   * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
>>>   */
>>>
>>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id);
>>>  extern bool asymmetric_match_key_ids(const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids,
>>>                                   const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id);
>>>
>>>  extern struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id);
>>>
>>> -static inline const char *asymmetric_key_id(const struct key *key)
>>> +static inline
>>> +const struct asymmetric_key_ids *asymmetric_key_ids(const struct key *key)
>>>  {
>>>      return key->type_data.p[1];
>>>  }
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> index 3bc71b4e1eed..6f16f647d21b 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c
>>> @@ -105,76 +105,15 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(const char *id)
>>>  }
>>>
>>>  /*
>>> - * Match asymmetric key id with partial match
>>> - * @id:             key id to match in a form "id:<id>"
>>> - */
>>> -int asymmetric_keyid_match(const char *kid, const char *id)
>>> -{
>>> -    size_t idlen, kidlen;
>>> -
>>> -    if (!kid || !id)
>>> -            return 0;
>>> -
>>> -    /* make it possible to use id as in the request: "id:<id>" */
>>> -    if (strncmp(id, "id:", 3) == 0)
>>> -            id += 3;
>>> -
>>> -    /* Anything after here requires a partial match on the ID string */
>>> -    idlen = strlen(id);
>>> -    kidlen = strlen(kid);
>>> -    if (idlen > kidlen)
>>> -            return 0;
>>> -
>>> -    kid += kidlen - idlen;
>>> -    if (strcasecmp(id, kid) != 0)
>>> -            return 0;
>>> -
>>> -    return 1;
>>> -}
>>> -EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asymmetric_keyid_match);
>>> -
>>> -/*
>>> - * Match asymmetric keys on (part of) their name
>>> - * We have some shorthand methods for matching keys.  We allow:
>>> - *
>>> - *  "<desc>"        - request a key by description
>>> - *  "id:<id>"       - request a key matching the ID
>>> - *  "<subtype>:<id>" - request a key of a subtype
>>> + * Match asymmetric keys by ID.
>>>   */
>>>  static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>>>                             const struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>>  {
>>> -    const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> -    const char *description = match_data->raw_data;
>>> -    const char *spec = description;
>>> -    const char *id;
>>> -    ptrdiff_t speclen;
>>> -
>>> -    if (!subtype || !spec || !*spec)
>>> -            return 0;
>>> -
>>> -    /* See if the full key description matches as is */
>>> -    if (key->description && strcmp(key->description, description) == 0)
>>> -            return 1;
>>> -
>>> -    /* All tests from here on break the criterion description into a
>>> -     * specifier, a colon and then an identifier.
>>> -     */
>>> -    id = strchr(spec, ':');
>>> -    if (!id)
>>> -            return 0;
>>> -
>>> -    speclen = id - spec;
>>> -    id++;
>>> -
>>> -    if (speclen == 2 && memcmp(spec, "id", 2) == 0)
>>> -            return asymmetric_keyid_match(asymmetric_key_id(key), id);
>>> +    const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>>> +    const struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id = match_data->preparsed;
>>>
>>> -    if (speclen == subtype->name_len &&
>>> -        memcmp(spec, subtype->name, speclen) == 0)
>>> -            return 1;
>>> -
>>> -    return 0;
>>> +    return asymmetric_match_key_ids(kids, match_id);
>>>  }
>>>
>>>  /*
>>> @@ -191,8 +130,30 @@ static bool asymmetric_key_cmp(const struct key *key,
>>>   */
>>>  static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>>  {
>>> -    match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *match_id;
>>> +    const char *spec = match_data->raw_data;
>>> +    const char *id;
>>> +
>>> +    if (!spec || !*spec)
>>> +            return -EINVAL;
>>> +    if (spec[0] == 'i' &&
>>> +        spec[1] == 'd' &&
>>> +        spec[2] == ':') {
>>> +            id = spec + 3;
>>> +    } else {
>>> +            goto default_match;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>> +    match_id = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(id);
>>> +    if (!match_id)
>>> +            return -ENOMEM;
>>> +
>>> +    match_data->preparsed = match_id;
>>>      match_data->cmp = asymmetric_key_cmp;
>>> +    match_data->lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_ITERATE;
>>> +    return 0;
>>> +
>>> +default_match:
>>>      return 0;
>>>  }
>>>
>>> @@ -201,6 +162,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_match_preparse(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>>   */
>>>  static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>>  {
>>> +    kfree(match_data->preparsed);
>>>  }
>>>
>>>  /*
>>> @@ -209,8 +171,10 @@ static void asymmetric_key_match_free(struct key_match_data *match_data)
>>>  static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>>>  {
>>>      const struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> -    const char *kid = asymmetric_key_id(key);
>>> -    size_t n;
>>> +    const struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = asymmetric_key_ids(key);
>>> +    const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> +    const unsigned char *p;
>>> +    int n;
>>>
>>>      seq_puts(m, key->description);
>>>
>>> @@ -218,13 +182,16 @@ static void asymmetric_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m)
>>>              seq_puts(m, ": ");
>>>              subtype->describe(key, m);
>>>
>>> -            if (kid) {
>>> +            if (kids && kids->id[0]) {
>>> +                    kid = kids->id[0];
>>>                      seq_putc(m, ' ');
>>> -                    n = strlen(kid);
>>> -                    if (n <= 8)
>>> -                            seq_puts(m, kid);
>>> -                    else
>>> -                            seq_puts(m, kid + n - 8);
>>> +                    n = kid->len;
>>> +                    p = kid->data;
>>> +                    if (n > 8) {
>>> +                            p += n - 8;
>>> +                            n = 8;
>>> +                    }
>>> +                    seq_printf(m, "%*phN", n, p);
>>>              }
>>>
>>>              seq_puts(m, " [");
>>> @@ -275,6 +242,7 @@ static int asymmetric_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>  static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>  {
>>>      struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = prep->type_data[0];
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = prep->type_data[1];
>>>
>>>      pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__);
>>>
>>> @@ -282,7 +250,11 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>              subtype->destroy(prep->payload[0]);
>>>              module_put(subtype->owner);
>>>      }
>>> -    kfree(prep->type_data[1]);
>>> +    if (kids) {
>>> +            kfree(kids->id[0]);
>>> +            kfree(kids->id[1]);
>>> +            kfree(kids);
>>> +    }
>>>      kfree(prep->description);
>>>  }
>>>
>>> @@ -292,13 +264,20 @@ static void asymmetric_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>  static void asymmetric_key_destroy(struct key *key)
>>>  {
>>>      struct asymmetric_key_subtype *subtype = asymmetric_key_subtype(key);
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids = key->type_data.p[1];
>>> +
>>>      if (subtype) {
>>>              subtype->destroy(key->payload.data);
>>>              module_put(subtype->owner);
>>>              key->type_data.p[0] = NULL;
>>>      }
>>> -    kfree(key->type_data.p[1]);
>>> -    key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>>> +
>>> +    if (kids) {
>>> +            kfree(kids->id[0]);
>>> +            kfree(kids->id[1]);
>>> +            kfree(kids);
>>> +            key->type_data.p[1] = NULL;
>>> +    }
>>>  }
>>>
>>>  struct key_type key_type_asymmetric = {
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> index 459d2077c61b..ad6ae9d7c884 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c
>>> @@ -29,6 +29,10 @@ struct pkcs7_parse_context {
>>>      enum OID        last_oid;               /* Last OID encountered */
>>>      unsigned        x509_index;
>>>      unsigned        sinfo_index;
>>> +    const void      *raw_serial;
>>> +    unsigned        raw_serial_size;
>>> +    unsigned        raw_issuer_size;
>>> +    const void      *raw_issuer;
>>>  };
>>>
>>>  /*
>>> @@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ static void pkcs7_free_signed_info(struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
>>>      if (sinfo) {
>>>              mpi_free(sinfo->sig.mpi[0]);
>>>              kfree(sinfo->sig.digest);
>>> +            kfree(sinfo->signing_cert_id);
>>>              kfree(sinfo);
>>>      }
>>>  }
>>> @@ -256,10 +261,10 @@ int pkcs7_extract_cert(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>      if (IS_ERR(x509))
>>>              return PTR_ERR(x509);
>>>
>>> -    pr_debug("Got cert for %s\n", x509->subject);
>>> -    pr_debug("- fingerprint %s\n", x509->fingerprint);
>>> -
>>>      x509->index = ++ctx->x509_index;
>>> +    pr_debug("Got cert %u for %s\n", x509->index, x509->subject);
>>> +    pr_debug("- fingerprint %*phN\n", x509->id->len, x509->id->data);
>>> +
>>>      *ctx->ppcerts = x509;
>>>      ctx->ppcerts = &x509->next;
>>>      return 0;
>>> @@ -348,8 +353,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                        const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>>  {
>>>      struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> -    ctx->sinfo->raw_serial = value;
>>> -    ctx->sinfo->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>>> +    ctx->raw_serial = value;
>>> +    ctx->raw_serial_size = vlen;
>>>      return 0;
>>>  }
>>>
>>> @@ -361,8 +366,8 @@ int pkcs7_sig_note_issuer(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                        const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>>  {
>>>      struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> -    ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer = value;
>>> -    ctx->sinfo->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>>> +    ctx->raw_issuer = value;
>>> +    ctx->raw_issuer_size = vlen;
>>>      return 0;
>>>  }
>>>
>>> @@ -395,10 +400,21 @@ int pkcs7_note_signed_info(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                         const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>>  {
>>>      struct pkcs7_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> -
>>> -    ctx->sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>>> -    *ctx->ppsinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>>> -    ctx->ppsinfo = &ctx->sinfo->next;
>>> +    struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo = ctx->sinfo;
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>> +
>>> +    /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>>> +    kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->raw_serial,
>>> +                                     ctx->raw_serial_size,
>>> +                                     ctx->raw_issuer,
>>> +                                     ctx->raw_issuer_size);
>>> +    if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> +            return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> +
>>> +    sinfo->signing_cert_id = kid;
>>> +    sinfo->index = ++ctx->sinfo_index;
>>> +    *ctx->ppsinfo = sinfo;
>>> +    ctx->ppsinfo = &sinfo->next;
>>>      ctx->sinfo = kzalloc(sizeof(struct pkcs7_signed_info), GFP_KERNEL);
>>>      if (!ctx->sinfo)
>>>              return -ENOMEM;
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> index d25f4d15370f..91949f92bc72 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.h
>>> @@ -33,10 +33,7 @@ struct pkcs7_signed_info {
>>>      const void      *authattrs;
>>>
>>>      /* Issuing cert serial number and issuer's name */
>>> -    const void      *raw_serial;
>>> -    unsigned        raw_serial_size;
>>> -    unsigned        raw_issuer_size;
>>> -    const void      *raw_issuer;
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *signing_cert_id;
>>>
>>>      /* Message signature.
>>>       *
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> index e666eb011a85..4e8dd7214753 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c
>>> @@ -49,8 +49,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
>>>               * keys.
>>>               */
>>> -            key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->subject,
>>> -                                              x509->fingerprint);
>>> +            key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id);
>>>              if (!IS_ERR(key))
>>>                      /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
>>>                       * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
>>> @@ -82,8 +81,7 @@ int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              return -ENOKEY;
>>>      }
>>>
>>> -    key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->issuer,
>>> -                                      last->authority);
>>> +    key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority);
>>>      if (IS_ERR(key))
>>>              return PTR_ERR(key) == -ENOMEM ? -ENOMEM : -ENOKEY;
>>>      x509 = last;
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> index c62cf8006e1f..57e90fa17f2b 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c
>>> @@ -131,8 +131,7 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>      struct x509_certificate *x509;
>>>      unsigned certix = 1;
>>>
>>> -    kenter("%u,%u,%u",
>>> -           sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_issuer_size);
>>> +    kenter("%u", sinfo->index);
>>>
>>>      for (x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, certix++) {
>>>              /* I'm _assuming_ that the generator of the PKCS#7 message will
>>> @@ -140,21 +139,11 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>               * PKCS#7 message - but I can't be 100% sure of that.  It's
>>>               * possible this will need element-by-element comparison.
>>>               */
>>> -            if (x509->raw_serial_size != sinfo->raw_serial_size ||
>>> -                memcmp(x509->raw_serial, sinfo->raw_serial,
>>> -                       sinfo->raw_serial_size) != 0)
>>> +            if (!asymmetric_key_id_same(x509->id, sinfo->signing_cert_id))
>>>                      continue;
>>>              pr_devel("Sig %u: Found cert serial match X.509[%u]\n",
>>>                       sinfo->index, certix);
>>>
>>> -            if (x509->raw_issuer_size != sinfo->raw_issuer_size ||
>>> -                memcmp(x509->raw_issuer, sinfo->raw_issuer,
>>> -                       sinfo->raw_issuer_size) != 0) {
>>> -                    pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 subject and PKCS#7 issuer don't match\n",
>>> -                            sinfo->index);
>>> -                    continue;
>>> -            }
>>> -
>>>              if (x509->pub->pkey_algo != sinfo->sig.pkey_algo) {
>>>                      pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 algo and PKCS#7 sig algo don't match\n",
>>>                              sinfo->index);
>>> @@ -164,8 +153,10 @@ static int pkcs7_find_key(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              sinfo->signer = x509;
>>>              return 0;
>>>      }
>>> +
>>>      pr_warn("Sig %u: Issuing X.509 cert not found (#%*ph)\n",
>>> -            sinfo->index, sinfo->raw_serial_size, sinfo->raw_serial);
>>> +            sinfo->index,
>>> +            sinfo->signing_cert_id->len, sinfo->signing_cert_id->data);
>>>      return -ENOKEY;
>>>  }
>>>
>>> @@ -184,7 +175,9 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              p->seen = false;
>>>
>>>      for (;;) {
>>> -            pr_debug("verify %s: %s\n", x509->subject, x509->fingerprint);
>>> +            pr_debug("verify %s: %*phN\n",
>>> +                     x509->subject,
>>> +                     x509->raw_serial_size, x509->raw_serial);
>>>              x509->seen = true;
>>>              ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>>>              if (ret < 0)
>>> @@ -192,7 +185,8 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>
>>>              pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
>>>              if (x509->authority)
>>> -                    pr_debug("- authkeyid %s\n", x509->authority);
>>> +                    pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
>>> +                             x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>>
>>>              if (!x509->authority ||
>>>                  strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
>>> @@ -218,13 +212,14 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              /* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
>>>               * list to see if the next one is there.
>>>               */
>>> -            pr_debug("- want %s\n", x509->authority);
>>> +            pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
>>> +                     x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>>              for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
>>> -                    pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %s\n", p->index, p->fingerprint);
>>> -                    if (p->raw_subject_size == x509->raw_issuer_size &&
>>> -                        strcmp(p->fingerprint, x509->authority) == 0 &&
>>> -                        memcmp(p->raw_subject, x509->raw_issuer,
>>> -                               x509->raw_issuer_size) == 0)
>>> +                    if (!p->skid)
>>> +                            continue;
>>> +                    pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
>>> +                             p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
>>> +                    if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
>>>                              goto found_issuer;
>>>              }
>>>
>>> @@ -233,7 +228,7 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
>>>              return 0;
>>>
>>>      found_issuer:
>>> -            pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", p->subject);
>>> +            pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
>>>              if (p->seen) {
>>>                      pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains loop\n",
>>>                              sinfo->index);
>>> @@ -304,7 +299,8 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
>>>              ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
>>>              if (ret < 0)
>>>                      return ret;
>>> -            pr_debug("X.509[%u] %s\n", n, x509->authority);
>>> +            pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
>>> +                     n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
>>>      }
>>>
>>>      for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> index ac72348c186a..96151b2b91a2 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c
>>> @@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert)
>>>              public_key_destroy(cert->pub);
>>>              kfree(cert->issuer);
>>>              kfree(cert->subject);
>>> -            kfree(cert->fingerprint);
>>> +            kfree(cert->id);
>>> +            kfree(cert->skid);
>>>              kfree(cert->authority);
>>>              kfree(cert->sig.digest);
>>>              mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s);
>>> @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>>>  {
>>>      struct x509_certificate *cert;
>>>      struct x509_parse_context *ctx;
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>>      long ret;
>>>
>>>      ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> @@ -89,6 +91,17 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen)
>>>      if (ret < 0)
>>>              goto error_decode;
>>>
>>> +    /* Generate cert issuer + serial number key ID */
>>> +    kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(cert->raw_serial,
>>> +                                     cert->raw_serial_size,
>>> +                                     cert->raw_issuer,
>>> +                                     cert->raw_issuer_size);
>>> +    if (IS_ERR(kid)) {
>>> +            ret = PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> +            goto error_decode;
>>> +    }
>>> +    cert->id = kid;
>>> +
>>>      kfree(ctx);
>>>      return cert;
>>>
>>> @@ -407,36 +420,34 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                         const void *value, size_t vlen)
>>>  {
>>>      struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context;
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *kid;
>>>      const unsigned char *v = value;
>>> -    char *f;
>>>      int i;
>>>
>>>      pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid);
>>>
>>>      if (ctx->last_oid == OID_subjectKeyIdentifier) {
>>>              /* Get hold of the key fingerprint */
>>> -            if (vlen < 3)
>>> +            if (ctx->cert->skid || vlen < 3)
>>>                      return -EBADMSG;
>>>              if (v[0] != ASN1_OTS || v[1] != vlen - 2)
>>>                      return -EBADMSG;
>>>              v += 2;
>>>              vlen -= 2;
>>>
>>> -            f = kmalloc(vlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> -            if (!f)
>>> -                    return -ENOMEM;
>>> -            for (i = 0; i < vlen; i++)
>>> -                    sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>>> -            pr_debug("fingerprint %s\n", f);
>>> -            ctx->cert->fingerprint = f;
>>> +            kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>>> +                                             ctx->cert->raw_subject,
>>> +                                             ctx->cert->raw_subject_size);
>>> +            if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> +                    return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> +            ctx->cert->skid = kid;
>>> +            pr_debug("subjkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>>>              return 0;
>>>      }
>>>
>>>      if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) {
>>> -            size_t key_len;
>>> -
>>>              /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */
>>> -            if (vlen < 5)
>>> +            if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5)
>>>                      return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>>              /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */
>>> @@ -454,7 +465,7 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                          v[3] > vlen - 4)
>>>                              return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>> -                    key_len = v[3];
>>> +                    vlen = v[3];
>>>                      v += 4;
>>>              } else {
>>>                      /* Long Form length */
>>> @@ -476,17 +487,17 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
>>>                          v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub)
>>>                              return -EBADMSG;
>>>
>>> -                    key_len = v[sub + 1];
>>> +                    vlen = v[sub + 1];
>>>                      v += (sub + 2);
>>>              }
>>>
>>> -            f = kmalloc(key_len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> -            if (!f)
>>> -                    return -ENOMEM;
>>> -            for (i = 0; i < key_len; i++)
>>> -                    sprintf(f + i * 2, "%02x", v[i]);
>>> -            pr_debug("authority   %s\n", f);
>>> -            ctx->cert->authority = f;
>>> +            kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(v, vlen,
>>> +                                             ctx->cert->raw_issuer,
>>> +                                             ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size);
>>> +            if (IS_ERR(kid))
>>> +                    return PTR_ERR(kid);
>>> +            pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data);
>>> +            ctx->cert->authority = kid;
>>>              return 0;
>>>      }
>>>
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> index 1b76f207c1f3..0e8d59b010fb 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h
>>> @@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ struct x509_certificate {
>>>      struct public_key_signature sig;        /* Signature parameters */
>>>      char            *issuer;                /* Name of certificate issuer */
>>>      char            *subject;               /* Name of certificate subject */
>>> -    char            *fingerprint;           /* Key fingerprint as hex */
>>> -    char            *authority;             /* Authority key fingerprint as hex */
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *id;           /* Issuer + serial number */
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *skid;         /* Subject key identifier */
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_id *authority;    /* Authority key identifier */
>>>      struct tm       valid_from;
>>>      struct tm       valid_to;
>>>      const void      *tbs;                   /* Signed data */
>>> diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> index f3d62307e6ee..c60905c3f4d2 100644
>>> --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c
>>> @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
>>>  #include "x509_parser.h"
>>>
>>>  static bool use_builtin_keys;
>>> -static char *ca_keyid;
>>> +static struct asymmetric_key_id *ca_keyid;
>>>
>>>  #ifndef MODULE
>>>  static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>>> @@ -33,10 +33,16 @@ static int __init ca_keys_setup(char *str)
>>>      if (!str)               /* default system keyring */
>>>              return 1;
>>>
>>> -    if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0)
>>> -            ca_keyid = str; /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>>> -    else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0)
>>> +    if (strncmp(str, "id:", 3) == 0) {
>>> +            struct asymmetric_key_id *p;
>>> +            p = asymmetric_key_hex_to_key_id(str);
>>> +            if (p == ERR_PTR(-EINVAL))
>>> +                    pr_err("Unparsable hex string in ca_keys\n");
>>> +            else if (!IS_ERR(p))
>>> +                    ca_keyid = p;   /* owner key 'id:xxxxxx' */
>>> +    } else if (strcmp(str, "builtin") == 0) {
>>>              use_builtin_keys = true;
>>> +    }
>>>
>>>      return 1;
>>>  }
>>> @@ -46,31 +52,28 @@ __setup("ca_keys=", ca_keys_setup);
>>>  /**
>>>   * x509_request_asymmetric_key - Request a key by X.509 certificate params.
>>>   * @keyring: The keys to search.
>>> - * @subject: The name of the subject to whom the key belongs.
>>> - * @key_id: The subject key ID as a hex string.
>>> + * @kid: The key ID.
>>>   *
>>>   * Find a key in the given keyring by subject name and key ID.  These might,
>>>   * for instance, be the issuer name and the authority key ID of an X.509
>>>   * certificate that needs to be verified.
>>>   */
>>>  struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>>> -                                    const char *subject,
>>> -                                    const char *key_id)
>>> +                                    const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid)
>>>  {
>>>      key_ref_t key;
>>> -    size_t subject_len = strlen(subject), key_id_len = strlen(key_id);
>>> -    char *id;
>>> +    char *id, *p;
>>>
>>> -    /* Construct an identifier "<subjname>:<keyid>". */
>>> -    id = kmalloc(subject_len + 2 + key_id_len + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +    /* Construct an identifier "id:<keyid>". */
>>> +    p = id = kmalloc(2 + 1 + kid->len * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>      if (!id)
>>>              return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
>>>
>>> -    memcpy(id, subject, subject_len);
>>> -    id[subject_len + 0] = ':';
>>> -    id[subject_len + 1] = ' ';
>>> -    memcpy(id + subject_len + 2, key_id, key_id_len);
>>> -    id[subject_len + 2 + key_id_len] = 0;
>>> +    *p++ = 'i';
>>> +    *p++ = 'd';
>>> +    *p++ = ':';
>>> +    p = bin2hex(p, kid->data, kid->len);
>>> +    *p = 0;
>>>
>>>      pr_debug("Look up: \"%s\"\n", id);
>>>
>>> @@ -195,11 +198,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>>>      if (!trust_keyring)
>>>              return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>
>>> -    if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_keyid_match(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>>> +    if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->authority, ca_keyid))
>>>              return -EPERM;
>>>
>>> -    key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
>>> -                                      cert->issuer, cert->authority);
>>> +    key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority);
>>>      if (!IS_ERR(key))  {
>>>              if (!use_builtin_keys
>>>                  || test_bit(KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN, &key->flags))
>>> @@ -214,9 +216,11 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert,
>>>   */
>>>  static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>  {
>>> +    struct asymmetric_key_ids *kids;
>>>      struct x509_certificate *cert;
>>> +    const char *q;
>>>      size_t srlen, sulen;
>>> -    char *desc = NULL;
>>> +    char *desc = NULL, *p;
>>>      int ret;
>>>
>>>      cert = x509_cert_parse(prep->data, prep->datalen);
>>> @@ -249,19 +253,12 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>               pkey_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_algo],
>>>               hash_algo_name[cert->sig.pkey_hash_algo]);
>>>
>>> -    if (!cert->fingerprint) {
>>> -            pr_warn("Cert for '%s' must have a SubjKeyId extension\n",
>>> -                    cert->subject);
>>> -            ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
>>> -            goto error_free_cert;
>>> -    }
>>> -
>>>      cert->pub->algo = pkey_algo[cert->pub->pkey_algo];
>>>      cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509;
>>>
>>>      /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */
>>>      if (!cert->authority ||
>>> -        strcmp(cert->fingerprint, cert->authority) == 0) {
>>> +        asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) {
>>>              ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */
>>>              if (ret < 0)
>>>                      goto error_free_cert;
>>> @@ -273,31 +270,47 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
>>>
>>>      /* Propose a description */
>>>      sulen = strlen(cert->subject);
>>> -    srlen = strlen(cert->fingerprint);
>>> +    srlen = cert->raw_serial_size;
>>> +    q = cert->raw_serial;
>>> +    if (srlen > 1 && *q == 0) {
>>> +            srlen--;
>>> +            q++;
>>> +    }
>>> +
>>>      ret = -ENOMEM;
>>> -    desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +    desc = kmalloc(sulen + 2 + srlen * 2 + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
>>>      if (!desc)
>>>              goto error_free_cert;
>>> -    memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>>> -    desc[sulen] = ':';
>>> -    desc[sulen + 1] = ' ';
>>> -    memcpy(desc + sulen + 2, cert->fingerprint, srlen);
>>> -    desc[sulen + 2 + srlen] = 0;
>>> +    p = memcpy(desc, cert->subject, sulen);
>>> +    p += sulen;
>>> +    *p++ = ':';
>>> +    *p++ = ' ';
>>> +    p = bin2hex(p, q, srlen);
>>> +    *p = 0;
>>> +
>>> +    kids = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_ids), GFP_KERNEL);
>>> +    if (!kids)
>>> +            goto error_free_desc;
>>> +    kids->id[0] = cert->id;
>>> +    kids->id[1] = cert->skid;
>>>
>>>      /* We're pinning the module by being linked against it */
>>>      __module_get(public_key_subtype.owner);
>>>      prep->type_data[0] = &public_key_subtype;
>>> -    prep->type_data[1] = cert->fingerprint;
>>> +    prep->type_data[1] = kids;
>>>      prep->payload[0] = cert->pub;
>>>      prep->description = desc;
>>>      prep->quotalen = 100;
>>>
>>>      /* We've finished with the certificate */
>>>      cert->pub = NULL;
>>> -    cert->fingerprint = NULL;
>>> +    cert->id = NULL;
>>> +    cert->skid = NULL;
>>>      desc = NULL;
>>>      ret = 0;
>>>
>>> +error_free_desc:
>>> +    kfree(desc);
>>>  error_free_cert:
>>>      x509_free_certificate(cert);
>>>      return ret;
>>> diff --git a/include/crypto/public_key.h b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> index 0d164c6af539..fa73a6fd536c 100644
>>> --- a/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> +++ b/include/crypto/public_key.h
>>> @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
>>>  #define _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H
>>>
>>>  #include <linux/mpi.h>
>>> +#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
>>>  #include <crypto/hash_info.h>
>>>
>>>  enum pkey_algo {
>>> @@ -98,8 +99,8 @@ struct key;
>>>  extern int verify_signature(const struct key *key,
>>>                          const struct public_key_signature *sig);
>>>
>>> +struct asymmetric_key_id;
>>>  extern struct key *x509_request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring,
>>> -                                           const char *issuer,
>>> -                                           const char *key_id);
>>> +                                           const struct asymmetric_key_id *kid);
>>>
>>>  #endif /* _LINUX_PUBLIC_KEY_H */
>>>
>>> --
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-- 
Thanks,
Dmitry
--
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