Message-ID: <546387B8.9050601@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 17:15:52 +0100
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/17.0 Thunderbird/17.0
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To: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
CC: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
        ABI/API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/8] crypto: AF_ALG: add random number generator support
References: <4738444.A2vZX1nNCo@tachyon.chronox.de> <1914037.Wy7EiDNG7B@tachyon.chronox.de>
In-Reply-To: <1914037.Wy7EiDNG7B@tachyon.chronox.de>
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Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org

On 11/12/2014 08:05 AM, Stephan Mueller wrote:
> This patch adds the random number generator support for AF_ALG.
>
> A random number generator's purpose is to generate data without
> requiring the caller to provide any data. Therefore, the AF_ALG
> interface handler for RNGs only implements a callback handler for
> recvmsg.
...
> +static int rng_recvmsg(struct kiocb *unused, struct socket *sock,
> +		       struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, int flags)
> +{
> +	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
> +	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> +	struct rng_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
> +	int err = -EFAULT;
> +
> +	if (0 == len)

if (len == 0)
	...

[And also other places.]

We don't use Yoda condition style in the kernel.

> +		return 0;
> +	if (MAXSIZE < len)
> +		len = MAXSIZE;
> +
> +	lock_sock(sk);
> +	len = crypto_rng_get_bytes(ctx->drng, ctx->result, len);
> +	if (0 > len)
> +		goto unlock;
> +
> +	err = memcpy_toiovec(msg->msg_iov, ctx->result, len);
> +	memset(ctx->result, 0, err);
> +

This looks buggy.

If copy_to_user() fails from within memcpy_toiovec(), we call memset()
with a negative return value which is interpreted as size_t and thus
causes a buffer overflow writing beyond ctx->result, no?

If it succeeds, we call memset(ctx->result, 0, 0) .....

> +unlock:
> +	release_sock(sk);
> +
> +	return err ? err : len;
> +}
> +
> +static struct proto_ops algif_rng_ops = {
> +	.family		=	PF_ALG,
> +
> +	.connect	=	sock_no_connect,
> +	.socketpair	=	sock_no_socketpair,
> +	.getname	=	sock_no_getname,
> +	.ioctl		=	sock_no_ioctl,
> +	.listen		=	sock_no_listen,
> +	.shutdown	=	sock_no_shutdown,
> +	.getsockopt	=	sock_no_getsockopt,
> +	.mmap		=	sock_no_mmap,
> +	.bind		=	sock_no_bind,
> +	.accept		=	sock_no_accept,
> +	.setsockopt	=	sock_no_setsockopt,
> +	.poll		=	sock_no_poll,
> +	.sendmsg	=	sock_no_sendmsg,
> +	.sendpage	=	sock_no_sendpage,
> +
> +	.release	=	af_alg_release,
> +	.recvmsg	=	rng_recvmsg,
> +};
> +
> +static void *rng_bind(const char *name, u32 type, u32 mask)
> +{
> +	return crypto_alloc_rng(name, type, mask);
> +}
> +
> +static void rng_release(void *private)
> +{
> +	crypto_free_rng(private);
> +}
> +
> +static void rng_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
> +{
> +	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> +	struct rng_ctx *ctx = ask->private;
> +
> +	memset(ctx->result, 0, MAXSIZE);

memset(ctx->result, 0, sizeof(ctx->result));

> +	sock_kfree_s(sk, ctx, ctx->len);
> +	af_alg_release_parent(sk);
> +}
> +
> +static int rng_accept_parent(void *private, struct sock *sk)
> +{
> +	struct rng_ctx *ctx;
> +	struct alg_sock *ask = alg_sk(sk);
> +	unsigned int len = sizeof(*ctx);
> +	int seedsize = crypto_rng_seedsize(private);
> +	int ret = -ENOMEM;
> +
> +	ctx = sock_kmalloc(sk, len, GFP_KERNEL);
> +	if (!ctx)
> +		return -ENOMEM;
> +	memset(ctx->result, 0, MAXSIZE);

Ditto...

> +	ctx->len = len;
> +
> +	if (seedsize) {
> +		u8 *buf = kmalloc(seedsize, GFP_KERNEL);
> +		if (!buf)
> +			goto err;
> +		get_random_bytes(buf, seedsize);
> +		ret = crypto_rng_reset(private, buf, len);
> +		kzfree(buf);

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