Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755382AbaKSOJQ (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Nov 2014 09:09:16 -0500 Received: from static.92.5.9.176.clients.your-server.de ([176.9.5.92]:41342 "EHLO mail.hallyn.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754564AbaKSOJN (ORCPT ); Wed, 19 Nov 2014 09:09:13 -0500 Date: Wed, 19 Nov 2014 15:09:11 +0100 From: "Serge E. Hallyn" To: Miklos Szeredi Cc: Seth Forshee , "Eric W. Biederman" , "Serge H. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski , Michael j Theall , fuse-devel , Kernel Mailing List , Linux-Fsdevel Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 2/4] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Message-ID: <20141119140911.GA27009@mail.hallyn.com> References: <1414013060-137148-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <1414013060-137148-3-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <20141111140454.GD333@tucsk> <87mw7xd9zt.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20141112130915.GG333@tucsk> <20141112162254.GB31775@ubuntu-hedt> <20141118152156.GA21726@ubuntu-mba51> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu): > On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 9:50 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > > On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Seth Forshee > > wrote: > >>> I asked around a bit, and it turns out there are use cases for nested > >> containers (i.e. a container within a container) where the rootfs for > >> the outer container mounts a filesystem containing the rootfs for the > >> inner container. If that mount is nosuid then suid utilities like ping > >> aren't going to work in the inner container. > >> > >> So since there's a use case for suid in a userns mount and we have what > >> we belive are sufficient protections against using this as a vector to > >> get privileges outside the container, I'm planning to move ahead without > >> the MNT_NOSUID restriction. Any objections? > > > > In the general case how'd we prevent suid executable being tricked to > > do something it shouldn't do by unprivileged mounting into sensitive > > places (i.e. config files) inside the container? The design of the namespaces would prevent that. You cannot manipulate your mounts namespace unless you own it. You cannot manipulate the mounts namespace for a task whose user namespace you do not own. If you can, for instance, bind mount $HOME/shadow onto /etc/shadow, then you already own your user namespace and are root there, so any suid-root program which you mount through fuse will only subjegate your own namespace. Any task which running in the parent user-ns (and therefore parent mount-ns) will not see your bind mount. > > Allowing SUID looks like a slippery slope to me. And there are plenty > > of solutions to the "ping" problem, AFAICS, that don't involve the > > suid bit. > > ping isn't even suid on my system, it has security.capability xattr instead. security.capability xattrs that will have the exact same concerns wrt confusion through bind mounts as suid. > Please just get rid of SUID/SGID. It's a legacy, it's a hack, not > worth the complexity and potential problems arising from that > complexity. Oh boy, I don't know which side to sit on here :) I'm all for replacing suid with some use of file capabilities, but realistically there are reasons why that hasn't happened more widely than it has - tar, package managers, cpio, nfs, etc. -serge -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/