Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752225AbaK3Uys (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Nov 2014 15:54:48 -0500 Received: from ipmail07.adl2.internode.on.net ([150.101.137.131]:31333 "EHLO ipmail07.adl2.internode.on.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751650AbaK3Uyr (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Nov 2014 15:54:47 -0500 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: Ak4RAOuCe1R5LLkm/2dsb2JhbABbgwaBKbNLAQEBAQEBBpRPhSIEAgKBCRcBAQEBAX2EAwEBBDocIxAIAxgJJQ8FJQMhE4g/0XcBAQgCAR8Yhh+JWWsHgymBHwEEnEaMMIkUHoNxKzCCRwEBAQ Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 07:54:30 +1100 From: Dave Chinner To: Richard Weinberger Cc: x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, pebolle@tiscali.nl, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: defconfig: Enable CONFIG_FHANDLE Message-ID: <20141130205430.GD16151@dastard> References: <1416958612-7448-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <1416958612-7448-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 12:36:52AM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote: > systemd has a hard dependency on CONFIG_FHANDLE. > If you run systemd with CONFIG_FHANDLE=n it will somehow > boot but fail to spawn a getty or other basic services. > As systemd is now used by most x86 distributions it > makes sense to enabled this by default and save kernel > hackers a lot of value debugging time. The bigger question to me is this: why does systemd need to store/open by handle rather than just opening paths directly when needed? This interface is intended for stable, pathless access to inodes across unmount/mount contexts (e.g. userspace NFS servers, filesystem backup programs, etc) so I'm curious as to the problem systemd is solving using this interface. I just can't see the problem being solved here, and why path based security checks on every open() aren't necessary... Cheers, Dave. -- Dave Chinner david@fromorbit.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/