Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752205AbaLAATG (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Nov 2014 19:19:06 -0500 Received: from ipmail07.adl2.internode.on.net ([150.101.137.131]:35191 "EHLO ipmail07.adl2.internode.on.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751920AbaLAATE (ORCPT ); Sun, 30 Nov 2014 19:19:04 -0500 X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: AkUQAEuze1R5LLkm/2dsb2JhbABbgwaBKbNMAQEBAgEGlE+FIgQCAoEKFwEBAQEBfYQCAQEBAwE6HCMFCwgDGAklDwUlAyETiDcI0WYBCyAYhh+JWWsHhEgBBJxGjDCJFB6DcSswgkcBAQE Date: Mon, 1 Dec 2014 11:18:49 +1100 From: Dave Chinner To: Richard Weinberger Cc: x86@kernel.org, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com, pebolle@tiscali.nl, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86: defconfig: Enable CONFIG_FHANDLE Message-ID: <20141201001849.GJ9561@dastard> References: <1416958612-7448-1-git-send-email-richard@nod.at> <20141130205430.GD16151@dastard> <547B8731.90305@nod.at> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <547B8731.90305@nod.at> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Sun, Nov 30, 2014 at 10:08:01PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote: > Am 30.11.2014 um 21:54 schrieb Dave Chinner: > > On Wed, Nov 26, 2014 at 12:36:52AM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote: > >> systemd has a hard dependency on CONFIG_FHANDLE. > >> If you run systemd with CONFIG_FHANDLE=n it will somehow > >> boot but fail to spawn a getty or other basic services. > >> As systemd is now used by most x86 distributions it > >> makes sense to enabled this by default and save kernel > >> hackers a lot of value debugging time. > > > > The bigger question to me is this: why does systemd need to > > store/open by handle rather than just opening paths directly when > > needed? This interface is intended for stable, pathless access to > > inodes across unmount/mount contexts (e.g. userspace NFS servers, > > filesystem backup programs, etc) so I'm curious as to the problem > > systemd is solving using this interface. I just can't see the > > problem being solved here, and why path based security checks on > > every open() aren't necessary... > > Digging inter systemd source shows that they are using name_to_handle_at() > to get the mount id of a given path. >From the name_to_handle_at() man page: The mount_id argument returns an identifier for the filesystem mount that corresponds to pathname. This corresponds to the first field in one of the records in /proc/self/mountinfo. Opening the pathname in the fifth field of that record yields a file descriptor for the mount point; that file descriptor can be used in a subsequent call to open_by_handle_at(). So why do they need CONFIG_FHANDLE to get the mount id in userspace? Indeed, what do they even need the mount id for? > The actual struct file_handle result is always ignored. That sounds like a classic case of interface abuse. i.e. using an interface for something it was not designed or intended for.... Cheers, Dave. -- Dave Chinner david@fromorbit.com -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/