Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752181AbaLETGu (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Dec 2014 14:06:50 -0500 Received: from mail-ie0-f170.google.com ([209.85.223.170]:50911 "EHLO mail-ie0-f170.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751437AbaLETGs (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Dec 2014 14:06:48 -0500 Message-ID: <54820244.5010304@gmail.com> Date: Fri, 05 Dec 2014 11:06:44 -0800 From: David Daney User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:17.0) Gecko/20130625 Thunderbird/17.0.7 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Kees Cook CC: Leonid Yegoshin , Linux MIPS Mailing List , Zubair.Kakakhel@imgtec.com, geert+renesas@glider.be, david.daney@cavium.com, Peter Zijlstra , Paul Gortmaker , davidlohr@hp.com, "Maciej W. Rozycki" , chenhc@lemote.com, cl@linux.com, Ingo Molnar , Richard Weinberger , =?UTF-8?B?UmFmYcWCIE1pxYJlY2tp?= , James Hogan , Tejun Heo , alex@alex-smith.me.uk, Paolo Bonzini , John Crispin , Paul Burton , qais.yousef@imgtec.com, LKML , Ralf Baechle , Markos Chandras , dengcheng.zhu@imgtec.com, manuel.lauss@gmail.com, lars.persson@axis.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 3/3] MIPS: set stack/data protection as non-executable References: <20141203015537.13886.50830.stgit@linux-yegoshin> <20141203015824.13886.74616.stgit@linux-yegoshin> <5481EB52.6060706@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 12/05/2014 10:51 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Fri, Dec 5, 2014 at 9:28 AM, David Daney wrote: >> On 12/02/2014 05:58 PM, Leonid Yegoshin wrote: >>> >>> This is a last step of 3 patches which shift FPU emulation out of >>> stack into protected area. So, it disables a default executable stack. >>> >>> Additionally, it sets a default data area non-executable protection. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Leonid Yegoshin >> >> >> NAK! >> >> Some programs require an executable stack, this patch will break them. > > Have you tested this? Do you require empirical evidence that the patch is incorrect, or is it enough to just to trust me when I say that it is incorrect? Typically the burden of proof is with those proposing the patches. > >> You can only select a non-executable stack in response to PT_GNU_STACK >> program headers in the ELF file of the executable program. > > This is already handled by fs/binfmt_elf.c. It does the parsing of the > PT_GNU_STACK needs, and sets up the stack flags appropriately. All the > change to VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS does is make sure that EXSTACK_DEFAULT > now means no VM_EXEC by default. If PT_GNU_STACK requires it, it gets > added back in. > The problem is not with "modern" executables that are properly annotated with PT_GNU_STACK. My objection is to the intentional breaking of old executables that have no PT_GNU_STACK annotation, but require an executable stack. Since we usually try not to break userspace, we cannot merge a patch like this one. David Daney. > -Kees > >> >> David Daney >> >> >> >>> --- >>> arch/mips/include/asm/page.h | 2 +- >>> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h >>> index 3be81803595d..d49ba81cb4ed 100644 >>> --- a/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h >>> +++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/page.h >>> @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ extern int __virt_addr_valid(const volatile void >>> *kaddr); >>> #define virt_addr_valid(kaddr) >>> \ >>> __virt_addr_valid((const volatile void *) (kaddr)) >>> >>> -#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC | \ >>> +#define VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS (VM_READ | VM_WRITE | \ >>> VM_MAYREAD | VM_MAYWRITE | VM_MAYEXEC) >>> >>> #define UNCAC_ADDR(addr) ((addr) - PAGE_OFFSET + UNCAC_BASE) >>> >>> >>> >>> >> > > > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/