Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755623AbaLHWWZ (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Dec 2014 17:22:25 -0500 Received: from mail-la0-f48.google.com ([209.85.215.48]:50315 "EHLO mail-la0-f48.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754643AbaLHWWU (ORCPT ); Mon, 8 Dec 2014 17:22:20 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <87mw6xpzb0.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> References: <52e0643bd47b1e5c65921d6e00aea1f724bb510a.1417281801.git.luto@amacapital.net> <87h9xez20g.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87mw75ygwp.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87fvcxyf28.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <874mtdyexp.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87a935u3nj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87388xodlj.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87h9x5re41.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87mw6xpzb0.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> From: Andy Lutomirski Date: Mon, 8 Dec 2014 14:21:58 -0800 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [CFT][PATCH 6/7] userns: Add a knob to disable setgroups on a per user namespace basis To: "Eric W. Biederman" Cc: Linux Containers , Josh Triplett , Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , Michael Kerrisk-manpages , Linux API , linux-man , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , LSM , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Richard Weinberger , Kenton Varda , stable Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Mon, Dec 8, 2014 at 2:11 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote: > > - Expose the knob to user space through a proc file /proc//setgroups > > A value of 0 means the setgroups system call is disabled in the "deny" > current processes user namespace and can not be enabled in the > future in this user namespace. > > A value of 1 means the segtoups system call is enabled. > "allow" > - Descedent user namespaces inherit the value of setgroups from s/Descedent/Descendent/ > --- a/kernel/groups.c > +++ b/kernel/groups.c > @@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ bool may_setgroups(void) > * the user namespace has been established. > */ > return userns_gid_mappings_established(user_ns) && > + userns_setgroups_allowed(user_ns) && > ns_capable(user_ns, CAP_SETGID); > } Can you add a comment explaining the ordering? For example: We need to check for a gid mapping before checking setgroups_allowed because an unprivileged user can create a userns with setgroups allowed, then disallow setgroups and add a mapping. If we check in the opposite order, then we have a race: we could see that setgroups is allowed before the user clears the bit and then see that there is a gid mapping after the other thread is done. --Andy -- Andy Lutomirski AMA Capital Management, LLC -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/