Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752203AbbDBUkR (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2015 16:40:17 -0400 Received: from ou.quest-ce.net ([195.154.187.82]:37513 "EHLO ou.quest-ce.net" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751083AbbDBUkN (ORCPT ); Thu, 2 Apr 2015 16:40:13 -0400 Message-ID: <1428007208.22575.104.camel@opteya.com> From: Yann Droneaud To: Shachar Raindel Cc: Haggai Eran , Sagi Grimberg , "oss-security@lists.openwall.com" , " (linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org)" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" , "stable@vger.kernel.org" Date: Thu, 02 Apr 2015 22:40:08 +0200 In-Reply-To: References: <1427969085.17020.5.camel@opteya.com> <1427981431.22575.21.camel@opteya.com> <551D5DC8.6070909@mellanox.com> <1427992506.22575.80.camel@opteya.com> Organization: OPTEYA Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.12.11 (3.12.11-1.fc21) Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 2a01:e35:2e9f:6ac0:ad87:feb4:96:262e X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ydroneaud@opteya.com Subject: Re: CVE-2014-8159 kernel: infiniband: uverbs: unprotected physical memory access X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Mon, 26 Dec 2011 16:24:06 +0000) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on ou.quest-ce.net) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2679 Lines: 73 Hi, Le jeudi 02 avril 2015 à 16:44 +0000, Shachar Raindel a écrit : > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Yann Droneaud [mailto:ydroneaud@opteya.com] > > Sent: Thursday, April 02, 2015 7:35 PM > > Another related question: as the large memory range could be registered > > by user space with ibv_reg_mr(pd, base, size, IB_ACCESS_ON_DEMAND), > > what's prevent the kernel to map a file as the result of mmap(0, ...) > > in this region, making it available remotely through IBV_WR_RDMA_READ / > > IBV_WR_RDMA_WRITE ? > > > > This is not a bug. This is a feature. > > Exposing a file through RDMA, using ODP, can be done exactly like this. > Given that the application explicitly requested this behavior, I don't > see why it is a problem. If the application cannot choose what will end up in the region it has registered, it's an issue ! What might happen if one library in a program call mmap(0, size, ...) to load a file storing a secret (a private key), and that file ends up being mapped in an registered but otherwise free region (afaict, the kernel is allowed to do it) ? What might happen if one library in a program call call mmap(0, size, ..., MAP_ANONYMOUS,...) to allocate memory, call mlock(), then write in this location a secret (a passphrase), and that area ends up in the memory region registered for on demand paging ? The application haven't choose to disclose these confidential piece of information, but they are available for reading/writing by remote through RDMA given it knows the rkey of the memory region (which is a 32bits value). I hope I'm missing something, because I'm not feeling confident such behavor is a feature. > Actually, some of our tests use such flows. > The mmu notifiers mechanism allow us to do this safely. When the page is > written back to disk, it is removed from the ODP mapping. When it is > accessed by the HCA, it is brought back to RAM. > I'm not discussing about the benefit of On Demand Paging and why it's a very good feature to expose files through RDMA. I'm trying to understand how the application can choose what is exposed through RDMA if it registers a very large memory region for later use (but do not actually explicitly map something there yet): what's the consequences ? void *start = sbrk(0); size_t size = ULONG_MAX - (unsigned long)start; ibv_reg_mr(pd, start, size, IB_ACCESS_ON_DEMAND) Regards. -- Yann Droneaud OPTEYA -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/