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Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2015 09:00:46 -0400
From: Mike Snitzer <snitzer@redhat.com>
To: Pali =?iso-8859-1?Q?Roh=E1r?= <pali.rohar@gmail.com>
Cc: Alasdair Kergon <agk@redhat.com>, Neil Brown <neilb@suse.de>,
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        dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-pm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/3] dm-crypt: Adds support for wiping key when doing
 suspend/hibernation
Message-ID: <20150406130045.GA18583@redhat.com>
References: <1428254419-7334-1-git-send-email-pali.rohar@gmail.com>
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On Sun, Apr 05 2015 at  1:20pm -0400,
Pali Roh?r <pali.rohar@gmail.com> wrote:

> This patch series increase security of suspend and hibernate actions. It allows
> user to safely wipe crypto keys before suspend and hibernate actions starts
> without race conditions on userspace process with heavy I/O.
> 
> To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before hibernate action call:
> $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key wipe_on_hibernation 1
> 
> To automatically wipe cryto key for <device> before suspend action call:
> $ dmsetup message <device> 0 key wipe_on_suspend 1
> 
> (Value 0 after wipe_* string reverts original behaviour - to not wipe key)

Can you elaborate on the attack vector your changes are meant to protect
against?  The user already authorized access, why is it inherently
dangerous to _not_ wipe the associated key across these events?
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