Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933474AbbDII42 (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Apr 2015 04:56:28 -0400 Received: from mail.kernel.org ([198.145.29.136]:43035 "EHLO mail.kernel.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755467AbbDII4P (ORCPT ); Thu, 9 Apr 2015 04:56:15 -0400 From: lizf@kernel.org To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Borkmann , "David S. Miller" , Zefan Li Subject: [PATCH 3.4 127/176] net: sctp: fix slab corruption from use after free on INIT collisions Date: Thu, 9 Apr 2015 16:46:15 +0800 Message-Id: <1428569224-23820-127-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1428569028-23762-1-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> References: <1428569028-23762-1-git-send-email-lizf@kernel.org> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 7090 Lines: 141 From: Daniel Borkmann 3.4.107-rc1 review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ commit 600ddd6825543962fb807884169e57b580dba208 upstream. When hitting an INIT collision case during the 4WHS with AUTH enabled, as already described in detail in commit 1be9a950c646 ("net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions"), it can happen that we occasionally still remotely trigger the following panic on server side which seems to have been uncovered after the fix from commit 1be9a950c646 ... [ 533.876389] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 533.913657] IP: [] __kmalloc+0x95/0x230 [ 533.940559] PGD 5030f2067 PUD 0 [ 533.957104] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 533.974283] Modules linked in: sctp mlx4_en [...] [ 534.939704] Call Trace: [ 534.951833] [] ? crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 534.984213] [] crypto_init_shash_ops+0x60/0xf0 [ 535.015025] [] __crypto_alloc_tfm+0x6d/0x170 [ 535.045661] [] crypto_alloc_base+0x4c/0xb0 [ 535.074593] [] ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x12/0x50 [ 535.105239] [] sctp_inet_listen+0x161/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 535.138606] [] SyS_listen+0x9d/0xb0 [ 535.166848] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b ... or depending on the the application, for example this one: [ 1370.026490] BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at 00000000ffffffff [ 1370.026506] IP: [] kmem_cache_alloc+0x75/0x1d0 [ 1370.054568] PGD 633c94067 PUD 0 [ 1370.070446] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP [ 1370.085010] Modules linked in: sctp kvm_amd kvm [...] [ 1370.963431] Call Trace: [ 1370.974632] [] ? SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.000863] [] SyS_epoll_ctl+0x53f/0x960 [ 1371.027154] [] ? anon_inode_getfile+0xd3/0x170 [ 1371.054679] [] ? __alloc_fd+0xa7/0x130 [ 1371.080183] [] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b With slab debugging enabled, we can see that the poison has been overwritten: [ 669.826368] BUG kmalloc-128 (Tainted: G W ): Poison overwritten [ 669.826385] INFO: 0xffff880228b32e50-0xffff880228b32e50. First byte 0x6a instead of 0x6b [ 669.826414] INFO: Allocated in sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] age=3 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826424] __slab_alloc+0x4bf/0x566 [ 669.826433] __kmalloc+0x280/0x310 [ 669.826453] sctp_auth_create_key+0x23/0x50 [sctp] [ 669.826471] sctp_auth_asoc_create_secret+0xcb/0x1e0 [sctp] [ 669.826488] sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key+0x68/0xa0 [sctp] [ 669.826505] sctp_do_sm+0x29d/0x17c0 [sctp] [...] [ 669.826629] INFO: Freed in kzfree+0x31/0x40 age=1 cpu=0 pid=18494 [ 669.826635] __slab_free+0x39/0x2a8 [ 669.826643] kfree+0x1d6/0x230 [ 669.826650] kzfree+0x31/0x40 [ 669.826666] sctp_auth_key_put+0x19/0x20 [sctp] [ 669.826681] sctp_assoc_update+0x1ee/0x2d0 [sctp] [ 669.826695] sctp_do_sm+0x674/0x17c0 [sctp] Since this only triggers in some collision-cases with AUTH, the problem at heart is that sctp_auth_key_put() on asoc->asoc_shared_key is called twice when having refcnt 1, once directly in sctp_assoc_update() and yet again from within sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() via sctp_assoc_update() on the already kzfree'd memory, which is also consistent with the observation of the poison decrease from 0x6b to 0x6a (note: the overwrite is detected at a later point in time when poison is checked on new allocation). Reference counting of auth keys revisited: Shared keys for AUTH chunks are being stored in endpoints and associations in endpoint_shared_keys list. On endpoint creation, a null key is being added; on association creation, all endpoint shared keys are being cached and thus cloned over to the association. struct sctp_shared_key only holds a pointer to the actual key bytes, that is, struct sctp_auth_bytes which keeps track of users internally through refcounting. Naturally, on assoc or enpoint destruction, sctp_shared_key are being destroyed directly and the reference on sctp_auth_bytes dropped. User space can add keys to either list via setsockopt(2) through struct sctp_authkey and by passing that to sctp_auth_set_key() which replaces or adds a new auth key. There, sctp_auth_create_key() creates a new sctp_auth_bytes with refcount 1 and in case of replacement drops the reference on the old sctp_auth_bytes. A key can be set active from user space through setsockopt() on the id via sctp_auth_set_active_key(), which iterates through either endpoint_shared_keys and in case of an assoc, invokes (one of various places) sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(). sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key() computes the actual secret from local's and peer's random, hmac and shared key parameters and returns a new key directly as sctp_auth_bytes, that is asoc->asoc_shared_key, plus drops the reference if there was a previous one. The secret, which where we eventually double drop the ref comes from sctp_auth_asoc_set_secret() with intitial refcount of 1, which also stays unchanged eventually in sctp_assoc_update(). This key is later being used for crypto layer to set the key for the hash in crypto_hash_setkey() from sctp_auth_calculate_hmac(). To close the loop: asoc->asoc_shared_key is freshly allocated secret material and independant of the sctp_shared_key management keeping track of only shared keys in endpoints and assocs. Hence, also commit 4184b2a79a76 ("net: sctp: fix memory leak in auth key management") is independant of this bug here since it concerns a different layer (though same structures being used eventually). asoc->asoc_shared_key is reference dropped correctly on assoc destruction in sctp_association_free() and when active keys are being replaced in sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(), it always has a refcount of 1. Hence, it's freed prematurely in sctp_assoc_update(). Simple fix is to remove that sctp_auth_key_put() from there which fixes these panics. Fixes: 730fc3d05cd4 ("[SCTP]: Implete SCTP-AUTH parameter processing") Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich Acked-by: Neil Horman Signed-off-by: David S. Miller Signed-off-by: Zefan Li --- net/sctp/associola.c | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/associola.c b/net/sctp/associola.c index da54d29..c37dbef 100644 --- a/net/sctp/associola.c +++ b/net/sctp/associola.c @@ -1272,7 +1272,6 @@ void sctp_assoc_update(struct sctp_association *asoc, asoc->peer.peer_hmacs = new->peer.peer_hmacs; new->peer.peer_hmacs = NULL; - sctp_auth_key_put(asoc->asoc_shared_key); sctp_auth_asoc_init_active_key(asoc, GFP_ATOMIC); } -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/