Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1948733AbbEBTr1 (ORCPT ); Sat, 2 May 2015 15:47:27 -0400 Received: from mail.linuxfoundation.org ([140.211.169.12]:46563 "EHLO mail.linuxfoundation.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1947095AbbEBTrS (ORCPT ); Sat, 2 May 2015 15:47:18 -0400 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , stable@vger.kernel.org, Jann Horn , Linus Torvalds , Charles Williams Subject: [PATCH 3.14 92/92] fs: take i_mutex during prepare_binprm for set[ug]id executables Date: Sat, 2 May 2015 21:03:47 +0200 Message-Id: <20150502190118.445013097@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.3.7 In-Reply-To: <20150502190109.683061482@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20150502190109.683061482@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.64 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-15 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3520 Lines: 124 3.14-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jann Horn commit 8b01fc86b9f425899f8a3a8fc1c47d73c2c20543 upstream. This prevents a race between chown() and execve(), where chowning a setuid-user binary to root would momentarily make the binary setuid root. This patch was mostly written by Linus Torvalds. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Charles Williams Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/exec.c | 76 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------- 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-) --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -1268,6 +1268,53 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct lin spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock); } +static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + struct inode *inode; + unsigned int mode; + kuid_t uid; + kgid_t gid; + + /* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */ + bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); + bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); + + if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) + return; + + if (current->no_new_privs) + return; + + inode = file_inode(bprm->file); + mode = ACCESS_ONCE(inode->i_mode); + if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) + return; + + /* Be careful if suid/sgid is set */ + mutex_lock(&inode->i_mutex); + + /* reload atomically mode/uid/gid now that lock held */ + mode = inode->i_mode; + uid = inode->i_uid; + gid = inode->i_gid; + mutex_unlock(&inode->i_mutex); + + /* We ignore suid/sgid if there are no mappings for them in the ns */ + if (!kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, uid) || + !kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, gid)) + return; + + if (mode & S_ISUID) { + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->cred->euid = uid; + } + + if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->cred->egid = gid; + } +} + /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. * Check permissions, then read the first 128 (BINPRM_BUF_SIZE) bytes @@ -1276,36 +1323,9 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct lin */ int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { - struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file); - umode_t mode = inode->i_mode; int retval; - - /* clear any previous set[ug]id data from a previous binary */ - bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); - bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - - if (!(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID) && - !current->no_new_privs && - kuid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_uid) && - kgid_has_mapping(bprm->cred->user_ns, inode->i_gid)) { - /* Set-uid? */ - if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->euid = inode->i_uid; - } - - /* Set-gid? */ - /* - * If setgid is set but no group execute bit then this - * is a candidate for mandatory locking, not a setgid - * executable. - */ - if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - bprm->cred->egid = inode->i_gid; - } - } + bprm_fill_uid(bprm); /* fill in binprm security blob */ retval = security_bprm_set_creds(bprm); -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/