Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S934725AbbEOMgT (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 May 2015 08:36:19 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:60496 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S934686AbbEOMgH (ORCPT ); Fri, 15 May 2015 08:36:07 -0400 Organization: Red Hat UK Ltd. Registered Address: Red Hat UK Ltd, Amberley Place, 107-111 Peascod Street, Windsor, Berkshire, SI4 1TE, United Kingdom. Registered in England and Wales under Company Registration No. 3798903 Subject: [PATCH 1/8] X.509: Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier [ver #4] From: David Howells To: rusty@rustcorp.com.au Cc: mmarek@suse.cz, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, keyrings@linux-nfs.org, dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, mcgrof@suse.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, seth.forshee@canonical.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, dwmw2@infradead.org Date: Fri, 15 May 2015 13:35:25 +0100 Message-ID: <20150515123524.16723.54713.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> In-Reply-To: <20150515123513.16723.96340.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> References: <20150515123513.16723.96340.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> User-Agent: StGit/0.17.1-dirty MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 13121 Lines: 388 Extract both parts of the AuthorityKeyIdentifier, not just the keyIdentifier, as the second part can be used to match X.509 certificates by issuer and serialNumber. Signed-off-by: David Howells Tested-by: Vivek Goyal --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile | 8 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c | 4 - crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c | 12 +- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 | 35 +++++++ crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c | 142 ++++++++++++++++++----------- crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h | 5 + crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c | 8 +- 7 files changed, 145 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-) create mode 100644 crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile index e47fcd9ac5e8..cd1406f9b14a 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/Makefile @@ -15,15 +15,21 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGO_RSA) += rsa.o obj-$(CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER) += x509_key_parser.o x509_key_parser-y := \ x509-asn1.o \ + x509_akid-asn1.o \ x509_rsakey-asn1.o \ x509_cert_parser.o \ x509_public_key.o -$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h +$(obj)/x509_cert_parser.o: \ + $(obj)/x509-asn1.h \ + $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h \ + $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h $(obj)/x509-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509-asn1.c $(obj)/x509-asn1.h +$(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_akid-asn1.h $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.o: $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.c $(obj)/x509_rsakey-asn1.h clean-files += x509-asn1.c x509-asn1.h +clean-files += x509_akid-asn1.c x509_akid-asn1.h clean-files += x509_rsakey-asn1.c x509_rsakey-asn1.h # diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c index 1d29376072da..0f6463b6692b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_trust.c @@ -85,8 +85,8 @@ static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the * trusted keys. */ - if (last && last->authority) { - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority, + if (last && last->akid_skid) { + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->akid_skid, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { x509 = last; diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c index cd455450b069..a4d083f7e9e1 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_verify.c @@ -187,11 +187,11 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509; pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer); - if (x509->authority) + if (x509->akid_skid) pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n", - x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); + x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data); - if (!x509->authority || + if (!x509->akid_skid || strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) { /* If there's no authority certificate specified, then * the certificate must be self-signed and is the root @@ -216,13 +216,13 @@ static int pkcs7_verify_sig_chain(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7, * list to see if the next one is there. */ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", - x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); + x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data); for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) { if (!p->skid) continue; pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n", p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data); - if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority)) + if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) goto found_issuer; } @@ -338,8 +338,6 @@ int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7) ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509); if (ret < 0) return ret; - pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n", - n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data); } for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) { diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1a33231a75a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_akid.asn1 @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +-- X.509 AuthorityKeyIdentifier +-- rfc5280 section 4.2.1.1 + +AuthorityKeyIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { + keyIdentifier [0] IMPLICIT KeyIdentifier OPTIONAL, + authorityCertIssuer [1] IMPLICIT GeneralNames OPTIONAL, + authorityCertSerialNumber [2] IMPLICIT CertificateSerialNumber OPTIONAL + } + +KeyIdentifier ::= OCTET STRING ({ x509_akid_note_kid }) + +CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER ({ x509_akid_note_serial }) + +GeneralNames ::= SEQUENCE OF GeneralName + +GeneralName ::= CHOICE { + otherName [0] ANY, + rfc822Name [1] IA5String, + dNSName [2] IA5String, + x400Address [3] ANY, + directoryName [4] Name ({ x509_akid_note_name }), + ediPartyName [5] ANY, + uniformResourceIdentifier [6] IA5String, + iPAddress [7] OCTET STRING, + registeredID [8] OBJECT IDENTIFIER + } + +Name ::= SEQUENCE OF RelativeDistinguishedName + +RelativeDistinguishedName ::= SET OF AttributeValueAssertion + +AttributeValueAssertion ::= SEQUENCE { + attributeType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ({ x509_note_OID }), + attributeValue ANY ({ x509_extract_name_segment }) + } diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c index a668d90302d3..6c130dd56f35 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_cert_parser.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include "public_key.h" #include "x509_parser.h" #include "x509-asn1.h" +#include "x509_akid-asn1.h" #include "x509_rsakey-asn1.h" struct x509_parse_context { @@ -35,6 +36,10 @@ struct x509_parse_context { u16 o_offset; /* Offset of organizationName (O) */ u16 cn_offset; /* Offset of commonName (CN) */ u16 email_offset; /* Offset of emailAddress */ + unsigned raw_akid_size; + const void *raw_akid; /* Raw authorityKeyId in ASN.1 */ + const void *akid_raw_issuer; /* Raw directoryName in authorityKeyId */ + unsigned akid_raw_issuer_size; }; /* @@ -48,7 +53,8 @@ void x509_free_certificate(struct x509_certificate *cert) kfree(cert->subject); kfree(cert->id); kfree(cert->skid); - kfree(cert->authority); + kfree(cert->akid_id); + kfree(cert->akid_skid); kfree(cert->sig.digest); mpi_free(cert->sig.rsa.s); kfree(cert); @@ -85,6 +91,18 @@ struct x509_certificate *x509_cert_parse(const void *data, size_t datalen) if (ret < 0) goto error_decode; + /* Decode the AuthorityKeyIdentifier */ + if (ctx->raw_akid) { + pr_devel("AKID: %u %*phN\n", + ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid_size, ctx->raw_akid); + ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_akid_decoder, ctx, + ctx->raw_akid, ctx->raw_akid_size); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_warn("Couldn't decode AuthKeyIdentifier\n"); + goto error_decode; + } + } + /* Decode the public key */ ret = asn1_ber_decoder(&x509_rsakey_decoder, ctx, ctx->key, ctx->key_size); @@ -422,7 +440,6 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; const unsigned char *v = value; - int i; pr_debug("Extension: %u\n", ctx->last_oid); @@ -449,57 +466,8 @@ int x509_process_extension(void *context, size_t hdrlen, if (ctx->last_oid == OID_authorityKeyIdentifier) { /* Get hold of the CA key fingerprint */ - if (ctx->cert->authority || vlen < 5) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Authority Key Identifier must be a Constructed SEQUENCE */ - if (v[0] != (ASN1_SEQ | (ASN1_CONS << 5))) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* Authority Key Identifier is not indefinite length */ - if (unlikely(vlen == ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH)) - return -EBADMSG; - - if (vlen < ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH) { - /* Short Form length */ - if (v[1] != vlen - 2 || - v[2] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID || - v[3] > vlen - 4) - return -EBADMSG; - - vlen = v[3]; - v += 4; - } else { - /* Long Form length */ - size_t seq_len = 0; - size_t sub = v[1] - ASN1_INDEFINITE_LENGTH; - - if (sub > 2) - return -EBADMSG; - - /* calculate the length from subsequent octets */ - v += 2; - for (i = 0; i < sub; i++) { - seq_len <<= 8; - seq_len |= v[i]; - } - - if (seq_len != vlen - 2 - sub || - v[sub] != SEQ_TAG_KEYID || - v[sub + 1] > vlen - 4 - sub) - return -EBADMSG; - - vlen = v[sub + 1]; - v += (sub + 2); - } - - kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer, - ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size, - v, vlen); - if (IS_ERR(kid)) - return PTR_ERR(kid); - pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); - ctx->cert->authority = kid; + ctx->raw_akid = v; + ctx->raw_akid_size = vlen; return 0; } @@ -569,3 +537,71 @@ int x509_note_not_after(void *context, size_t hdrlen, struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; return x509_note_time(&ctx->cert->valid_to, hdrlen, tag, value, vlen); } + +/* + * Note a key identifier-based AuthorityKeyIdentifier + */ +int x509_akid_note_kid(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; + + pr_debug("AKID: keyid: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value); + + if (ctx->cert->akid_skid) + return 0; + + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(ctx->cert->raw_issuer, + ctx->cert->raw_issuer_size, + value, vlen); + if (IS_ERR(kid)) + return PTR_ERR(kid); + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); + ctx->cert->akid_skid = kid; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note a directoryName in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier + */ +int x509_akid_note_name(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + + pr_debug("AKID: name: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value); + + ctx->akid_raw_issuer = value; + ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size = vlen; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Note a serial number in an AuthorityKeyIdentifier + */ +int x509_akid_note_serial(void *context, size_t hdrlen, + unsigned char tag, + const void *value, size_t vlen) +{ + struct x509_parse_context *ctx = context; + struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; + + pr_debug("AKID: serial: %*phN\n", (int)vlen, value); + + if (!ctx->akid_raw_issuer || ctx->cert->akid_id) + return 0; + + kid = asymmetric_key_generate_id(value, + vlen, + ctx->akid_raw_issuer, + ctx->akid_raw_issuer_size); + if (IS_ERR(kid)) + return PTR_ERR(kid); + + pr_debug("authkeyid %*phN\n", kid->len, kid->data); + ctx->cert->akid_id = kid; + return 0; +} diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h index 3dfe6b5d6f0b..dcdb5c94f514 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_parser.h @@ -19,9 +19,10 @@ struct x509_certificate { struct public_key_signature sig; /* Signature parameters */ char *issuer; /* Name of certificate issuer */ char *subject; /* Name of certificate subject */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Serial number + issuer */ + struct asymmetric_key_id *id; /* Issuer + Serial number */ struct asymmetric_key_id *skid; /* Subject + subjectKeyId (optional) */ - struct asymmetric_key_id *authority; /* Authority key identifier (optional) */ + struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_id; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->id (optional) */ + struct asymmetric_key_id *akid_skid; /* CA AuthKeyId matching ->skid (optional) */ struct tm valid_from; struct tm valid_to; const void *tbs; /* Signed data */ diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c index a6c42031628e..49b875b709d5 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/x509_public_key.c @@ -214,10 +214,10 @@ static int x509_validate_trust(struct x509_certificate *cert, if (!trust_keyring) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->authority, ca_keyid)) + if (ca_keyid && !asymmetric_key_id_partial(cert->akid_skid, ca_keyid)) return -EPERM; - key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->authority, + key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, cert->akid_skid, false); if (!IS_ERR(key)) { if (!use_builtin_keys @@ -274,8 +274,8 @@ static int x509_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) cert->pub->id_type = PKEY_ID_X509; /* Check the signature on the key if it appears to be self-signed */ - if (!cert->authority || - asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->authority)) { + if (!cert->akid_skid || + asymmetric_key_id_same(cert->skid, cert->akid_skid)) { ret = x509_check_signature(cert->pub, cert); /* self-signed */ if (ret < 0) goto error_free_cert; -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/