Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756736AbbEUPxh (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 May 2015 11:53:37 -0400 Received: from lan.nucleusys.com ([92.247.61.126]:43777 "EHLO zztop.nucleusys.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-FAIL) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754830AbbEUPxc (ORCPT ); Thu, 21 May 2015 11:53:32 -0400 Date: Thu, 21 May 2015 18:53:19 +0300 From: Petko Manolov To: Greg Kroah-Hartman Cc: Mimi Zohar , One Thousand Gnomes , Seth Forshee , "Luis R. Rodriguez" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Kyle McMartin , David Woodhouse , Joey Lee , Rusty Russell , mricon@kernel.org Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing Message-ID: <20150521155319.GG18164@localhost> Mail-Followup-To: Greg Kroah-Hartman , Mimi Zohar , One Thousand Gnomes , Seth Forshee , "Luis R. Rodriguez" , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com, serge@hallyn.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, David Howells , Kyle McMartin , David Woodhouse , Joey Lee , Rusty Russell , mricon@kernel.org References: <20150519200232.GM23057@wotan.suse.de> <20150520140426.GB126473@ubuntu-hedt> <20150520172446.4dab5399@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> <20150520164613.GD10473@localhost> <20150521044104.GH22632@kroah.com> <20150521054101.GA15037@localhost> <20150521061453.GC30864@kroah.com> <1432213521.4230.43.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20150521154508.GA11821@kroah.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20150521154508.GA11821@kroah.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) X-Spam-Score: -1.0 (-) X-Spam-Report: Spam detection software, running on the system "zztop.nucleusys.com", has identified this incoming email as possible spam. The original message has been attached to this so you can view it (if it isn't spam) or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: On 15-05-21 08:45:08, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 09:05:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > Signatures don't provide any guarantees as to code quality or > > correctness. They do provide file integrity and provenance. In > > addition to the license and a Signed-off-by line, having the firmware > > provider include a signature of the firmware would be nice. > > That would be "nice", but that's not going to be happening here, from what I > can tell. The firmware provider should be putting the signature inside the > firmware image itself, and verifying it on the device, in order to properly > "know" that it should be running that firmware. The kernel shouldn't be > involved here at all, as Alan pointed out. [...] Content analysis details: (-1.0 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1602 Lines: 34 On 15-05-21 08:45:08, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > On Thu, May 21, 2015 at 09:05:21AM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote: > > > > Signatures don't provide any guarantees as to code quality or > > correctness. They do provide file integrity and provenance. In > > addition to the license and a Signed-off-by line, having the firmware > > provider include a signature of the firmware would be nice. > > That would be "nice", but that's not going to be happening here, from what I > can tell. The firmware provider should be putting the signature inside the > firmware image itself, and verifying it on the device, in order to properly > "know" that it should be running that firmware. The kernel shouldn't be > involved here at all, as Alan pointed out. It is device's job to verify firmware's correctness. It is user's job to verify vendor's identity. Two different things, not related to each other. I think Alan meant something else. What i read is that if somebody have physical access to the device they may harm the device much easier and would not bother to tamper with firmware. > > > What is verifying a firmware image signature in the kernel attesting > > > that isn't already known in userspace? > > > > Appraising and enforcing firmware integrity before use. > > That should be done on the device itself, not in the kernel. Oh, well... -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/