Message-ID: <1432669955.2450.269.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFD] linux-firmware key arrangement for firmware signing
From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Cc: Petko Manolov <petkan@mip-labs.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
        "Luis R. Rodriguez" <mcgrof@suse.com>,
        linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, james.l.morris@oracle.com,
        serge@hallyn.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
        Kyle McMartin <kyle@kernel.org>,
        David Woodhouse <david.woodhouse@intel.com>, Joey Lee <jlee@suse.de>,
        Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>, mricon@kernel.org
Date: Tue, 26 May 2015 15:52:35 -0400
In-Reply-To: <20150526180813.0ba1b5f5@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
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	 <20150521054101.GA15037@localhost>	<20150521061453.GC30864@kroah.com>
	 <1432213521.4230.43.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
	 <20150521154508.GA11821@kroah.com>	<20150521155319.GG18164@localhost>
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On Tue, 2015-05-26 at 18:08 +0100, One Thousand Gnomes wrote:

> IMHO we want the supplier of a given firmware providing signatures on
> the firmware git tree if this is done. A generic linux-firmware owned key
> would be both a horrendously inviting attack target, and a single point of
> failure.
> 
> Git can already do all the needed commit signing bits unless I'm missing
> something here ?

Nice!  I haven't tried signing commits yet.  Assuming the signatures can
be extracted from git, the firmware blob git commit signature could be
stored either as a security xattr or appended (eg. similar to kernel
modules).  The end system owner could then make the decision to load the
associated public key or not.

Mimi

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