Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933137AbbFEOdF (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Jun 2015 10:33:05 -0400 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:59631 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S932892AbbFEN7O (ORCPT ); Fri, 5 Jun 2015 09:59:14 -0400 From: Luis Henriques To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Helge Deller , linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org, James Hogan , linux-metag@vger.kernel.org, Luis Henriques Subject: [PATCH 3.16.y-ckt 039/110] parisc,metag: Fix crashes due to stack randomization on stack-grows-upwards architectures Date: Fri, 5 Jun 2015 14:57:22 +0100 Message-Id: <1433512713-22984-40-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.4 In-Reply-To: <1433512713-22984-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> References: <1433512713-22984-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.16 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3674 Lines: 91 3.16.7-ckt13 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Helge Deller commit d045c77c1a69703143a36169c224429c48b9eecd upstream. On architectures where the stack grows upwards (CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP=y, currently parisc and metag only) stack randomization sometimes leads to crashes when the stack ulimit is set to lower values than STACK_RND_MASK (which is 8 MB by default if not defined in arch-specific headers). The problem is, that when the stack vm_area_struct is set up in fs/exec.c, the additional space needed for the stack randomization (as defined by the value of STACK_RND_MASK) was not taken into account yet and as such, when the stack randomization code added a random offset to the stack start, the stack effectively got smaller than what the user defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK) which then sometimes leads to out-of-stack situations and crashes. This patch fixes it by adding the maximum possible amount of memory (based on STACK_RND_MASK) which theoretically could be added by the stack randomization code to the initial stack size. That way, the user-defined stack size is always guaranteed to be at minimum what is defined via rlimit_max(RLIMIT_STACK). This bug is currently not visible on the metag architecture, because on metag STACK_RND_MASK is defined to 0 which effectively disables stack randomization. The changes to fs/exec.c are inside an "#ifdef CONFIG_STACK_GROWSUP" section, so it does not affect other platformws beside those where the stack grows upwards (parisc and metag). Signed-off-by: Helge Deller Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org Cc: James Hogan Cc: linux-metag@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Luis Henriques --- arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h | 4 ++++ arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c | 3 +++ fs/exec.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h index 3391d061eccc..78c9fd32c554 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h +++ b/arch/parisc/include/asm/elf.h @@ -348,6 +348,10 @@ struct pt_regs; /* forward declaration... */ #define ELF_HWCAP 0 +#define STACK_RND_MASK (is_32bit_task() ? \ + 0x7ff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12) : \ + 0x3ffff >> (PAGE_SHIFT - 12)) + struct mm_struct; extern unsigned long arch_randomize_brk(struct mm_struct *); #define arch_randomize_brk arch_randomize_brk diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c index e1ffea2f9a0b..5aba01ac457f 100644 --- a/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c +++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/sys_parisc.c @@ -77,6 +77,9 @@ static unsigned long mmap_upper_limit(void) if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX) stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX; + /* Add space for stack randomization. */ + stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); + return PAGE_ALIGN(STACK_TOP - stack_base); } diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 68a0843250c9..993ed0aba99a 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -662,6 +662,9 @@ int setup_arg_pages(struct linux_binprm *bprm, if (stack_base > STACK_SIZE_MAX) stack_base = STACK_SIZE_MAX; + /* Add space for stack randomization. */ + stack_base += (STACK_RND_MASK << PAGE_SHIFT); + /* Make sure we didn't let the argument array grow too large. */ if (vma->vm_end - vma->vm_start > stack_base) return -ENOMEM; -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/