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Date: Sat, 11 Jul 2015 13:30:52 +0200
Message-ID: <CAFLxGvxO7EtBapTuO5vWuS20hdRxPxr=s=Co7=kTbh8DhFWEuA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: kdbus: credential faking
From: Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
        Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, Daniel Mack <daniel@zonque.org>,
        Djalal Harouni <tixxdz@opendz.org>,
        lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
        Paul Osmialowski <p.osmialowsk@samsung.com>,
        Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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On Fri, Jul 10, 2015 at 8:36 PM, Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
> On some systems the uid is being used as an application identifier
> instead of a human identifier. The access controls are not designed
> for this. The POSIX capabilities aren't designed for this. If Fred
> creates a program that is setuid to fred and gets Barney to run it,
> you hold Fred accountable. If a malicious (or compromised) application
> identified by "fred" creates a setuid fred program and the "barney"
> application runs it, who do you hold accountable? It's a completely
> different mindset. Sure, you can wedge the one into the other, but
> it's not the intended use. Hence, misuse or abuse.

Actually that's an interesting thought.
The question is whether the /run/user/<uid>/bus security model works
also for "special" userland like Android.
To my knowledge on Android each application runs as different user.

If kdbus gets merged it would be nice to have to work with all kinds of userland
and not only Fedora.

-- 
Thanks,
//richard
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