Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S932161AbbGPBvC (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:51:02 -0400 Received: from youngberry.canonical.com ([91.189.89.112]:55769 "EHLO youngberry.canonical.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1754674AbbGPBKy (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:10:54 -0400 From: Kamal Mostafa To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org, kernel-team@lists.ubuntu.com Cc: Mimi Zohar , "Dr. Greg Wettstein" , Kamal Mostafa Subject: [PATCH 3.19.y-ckt 121/251] ima: extend "mask" policy matching support Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 18:07:22 -0700 Message-Id: <1437008972-9140-122-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.1 In-Reply-To: <1437008972-9140-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> References: <1437008972-9140-1-git-send-email-kamal@canonical.com> X-Extended-Stable: 3.19 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 3578 Lines: 102 3.19.8-ckt4 -stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Mimi Zohar commit 4351c294b8c1028077280f761e158d167b592974 upstream. The current "mask" policy option matches files opened as MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_APPEND or MAY_EXEC. This patch extends the "mask" option to match files opened containing one of these modes. For example, "mask=^MAY_READ" would match files opened read-write. Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar Signed-off-by: Dr. Greg Wettstein Signed-off-by: Kamal Mostafa --- Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 20 +++++++++++++++----- 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy index 4a571fa..0a378a8 100644 --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ Description: base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][FILE_CHECK][MODULE_CHECK] [FIRMWARE_CHECK] - mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC] + mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] + [[^]MAY_EXEC] fsmagic:= hex value fsuuid:= file system UUID (e.g 8bcbe394-4f13-4144-be8e-5aa9ea2ce2f6) uid:= decimal value diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index d0f4c92..60ea656 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ #define IMA_UID 0x0008 #define IMA_FOWNER 0x0010 #define IMA_FSUUID 0x0020 +#define IMA_INMASK 0x0040 #define IMA_EUID 0x0080 #define UNKNOWN 0 @@ -187,6 +188,9 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && (rule->mask != mask && func != POST_SETATTR)) return false; + if ((rule->flags & IMA_INMASK) && + (!(rule->mask & mask) && func != POST_SETATTR)) + return false; if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC) && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic) return false; @@ -452,6 +456,7 @@ static void ima_log_string(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key, char *value) static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) { struct audit_buffer *ab; + char *from; char *p; int result = 0; @@ -542,18 +547,23 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) if (entry->mask) result = -EINVAL; - if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) + from = args[0].from; + if (*from == '^') + from++; + + if ((strcmp(from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0) entry->mask = MAY_EXEC; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_WRITE; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_READ") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_READ; - else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) + else if (strcmp(from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0) entry->mask = MAY_APPEND; else result = -EINVAL; if (!result) - entry->flags |= IMA_MASK; + entry->flags |= (*args[0].from == '^') + ? IMA_INMASK : IMA_MASK; break; case Opt_fsmagic: ima_log_string(ab, "fsmagic", args[0].from); -- 1.9.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/