Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754624AbbGPCxj (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Jul 2015 22:53:39 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:49706 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752520AbbGPCxh (ORCPT ); Wed, 15 Jul 2015 22:53:37 -0400 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Seth Forshee Cc: Alexander Viro , Jeff Layton , "J. Bruce Fields" , Serge Hallyn , Andy Lutomirski , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org References: <1436989569-69582-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <1436989569-69582-2-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> Date: Wed, 15 Jul 2015 21:47:11 -0500 In-Reply-To: <1436989569-69582-2-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (Seth Forshee's message of "Wed, 15 Jul 2015 14:46:02 -0500") Message-ID: <87a8uw95u8.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.3 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX19sOkiSZYSZSjWU9QxNmECFtsqibgDNV+0= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 67.3.205.90 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 TVD_RCVD_IP Message was received from an IP address * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: No description available. * 0.8 BAYES_50 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 40 to 60% * [score: 0.5000] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa01 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa01 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: **;Seth Forshee X-Spam-Relay-Country: X-Spam-Timing: total 1568 ms - load_scoreonly_sql: 0.05 (0.0%), signal_user_changed: 4.0 (0.3%), b_tie_ro: 2.8 (0.2%), parse: 1.23 (0.1%), extract_message_metadata: 26 (1.7%), get_uri_detail_list: 2.5 (0.2%), tests_pri_-1000: 10 (0.7%), tests_pri_-950: 2.0 (0.1%), tests_pri_-900: 1.68 (0.1%), tests_pri_-400: 32 (2.0%), check_bayes: 30 (1.9%), b_tokenize: 12 (0.7%), b_tok_get_all: 8 (0.5%), b_comp_prob: 4.2 (0.3%), b_tok_touch_all: 2.7 (0.2%), b_finish: 0.85 (0.1%), tests_pri_0: 1479 (94.3%), tests_pri_500: 7 (0.4%), rewrite_mail: 0.00 (0.0%) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/7] fs: Add user namesapace member to struct super_block X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 24 Sep 2014 11:00:52 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 2190 Lines: 49 Seth Forshee writes: > Initially this will be used to eliminate the implicit MNT_NODEV > flag for mounts from user namespaces. In the future it will also > be used for translating ids and checking capabilities for > filesystems mounted from user namespaces. > > s_user_ns is initialized in alloc_super() and is generally set to > current_user_ns(). To avoid security and corruption issues, two > additional mount checks are also added: > > - do_new_mount() gains a check that the user has CAP_SYS_ADMIN > in current_user_ns(). > > - sget() will fail with EBUSY when the filesystem it's looking > for is already mounted from another user namespace. > > proc needs some special handling here. The user namespace of > current isn't appropriate when forking as a result of clone (2) > with CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWUSER, as it will make proc unmountable > from within the new user namespace. Instead, the user namespace > which owns the new pid namespace should be used. sget_userns() is > added to allow passing of a user namespace other than that of > current, and this is used by proc_mount(). sget() becomes a > wrapper around sget_userns() which passes current_user_ns(). >From bits of the previous conversation. We need sget_userns(..., &init_user_ns) for sysfs. The sysfs xattrs can travel from one mount of sysfs to another via the sysfs backing store. For tmpfs and any other filesystems we support mounting without privilige that support xattrs. We need to identify them and see if userspace is taking advantage of the ability to set xattrs and file caps (unlikely). If they are we need to call sget_userns(..., &init_user_ns) on those filesystems as well. Possibly/Probably we should just do that for all of the interesting filesystems to start with and then change back to an ordinary old sget after we have done the testing and confirmed we will not be introducing userspace regressions. Eric -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/