Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752809AbbG2FmL (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 01:42:11 -0400 Received: from mail-yk0-f176.google.com ([209.85.160.176]:33946 "EHLO mail-yk0-f176.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752617AbbG2Fll (ORCPT ); Wed, 29 Jul 2015 01:41:41 -0400 From: Brian Gerst To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Ingo Molnar , "H. Peter Anvin" , Denys Vlasenko , Andy Lutomirski , Linus Torvalds Subject: [PATCH 7/8] x86/vm86: Rename vm86->vm86_info to user_vm86 Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2015 01:41:22 -0400 Message-Id: <1438148483-11932-8-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.4.3 In-Reply-To: <1438148483-11932-1-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com> References: <1438148483-11932-1-git-send-email-brgerst@gmail.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 6427 Lines: 172 Make it clearer that this is the pointer to the userspace vm86 state area. Signed-off-by: Brian Gerst --- arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h index 05f6394..5c027c5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vm86.h @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ struct kernel_vm86_regs { }; struct vm86 { - struct vm86plus_struct __user *vm86_info; + struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86; struct pt_regs regs32; unsigned long v86flags; unsigned long v86mask; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c index 6fce378..aca499d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vm86_32.c @@ -104,17 +104,17 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval) */ local_irq_enable(); - if (!vm86 || !vm86->vm86_info) { - pr_alert("no vm86_info: BAD\n"); + if (!vm86 || !vm86->user_vm86) { + pr_alert("no user_vm86: BAD\n"); do_exit(SIGSEGV); } set_flags(regs->pt.flags, VEFLAGS, X86_EFLAGS_VIF | vm86->v86mask); - user = vm86->vm86_info; + user = vm86->user_vm86; if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, user, vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus ? sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct) : sizeof(struct vm86_struct))) { - pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86_info\n"); + pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n"); do_exit(SIGSEGV); } @@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ void save_v86_state(struct kernel_vm86_regs *regs, int retval) put_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user->screen_bitmap); } put_user_catch(err); if (err) { - pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86_info\n"); + pr_alert("could not access userspace vm86 info\n"); do_exit(SIGSEGV); } @@ -199,11 +199,11 @@ static inline int do_vm86_irq_handling(int subfunction, int irqnumber) } #endif -static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus); +static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus); -SYSCALL_DEFINE1(vm86old, struct vm86_struct __user *, v86) +SYSCALL_DEFINE1(vm86old, struct vm86_struct __user *, user_vm86) { - return do_sys_vm86((struct vm86plus_struct __user *) v86, false); + return do_sys_vm86((struct vm86plus_struct __user *) user_vm86, false); } @@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(vm86, unsigned long, cmd, unsigned long, arg) } -static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus) +static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *user_vm86, bool plus) { struct tss_struct *tss; struct task_struct *tsk = current; @@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus) if (vm86->saved_sp0) return -EPERM; - if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, v86, plus ? + if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, user_vm86, plus ? sizeof(struct vm86_struct) : sizeof(struct vm86plus_struct))) return -EFAULT; @@ -255,40 +255,42 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus) memset(&vm86regs, 0, sizeof(vm86regs)); get_user_try { unsigned short seg; - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bx, &v86->regs.ebx); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.cx, &v86->regs.ecx); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.dx, &v86->regs.edx); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.si, &v86->regs.esi); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.di, &v86->regs.edi); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bp, &v86->regs.ebp); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ax, &v86->regs.eax); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ip, &v86->regs.eip); - get_user_ex(seg, &v86->regs.cs); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bx, &user_vm86->regs.ebx); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.cx, &user_vm86->regs.ecx); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.dx, &user_vm86->regs.edx); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.si, &user_vm86->regs.esi); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.di, &user_vm86->regs.edi); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.bp, &user_vm86->regs.ebp); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ax, &user_vm86->regs.eax); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.ip, &user_vm86->regs.eip); + get_user_ex(seg, &user_vm86->regs.cs); vm86regs.pt.cs = seg; - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.flags, &v86->regs.eflags); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.sp, &v86->regs.esp); - get_user_ex(seg, &v86->regs.ss); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.flags, &user_vm86->regs.eflags); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.pt.sp, &user_vm86->regs.esp); + get_user_ex(seg, &user_vm86->regs.ss); vm86regs.pt.ss = seg; - get_user_ex(vm86regs.es, &v86->regs.es); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.ds, &v86->regs.ds); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.fs, &v86->regs.fs); - get_user_ex(vm86regs.gs, &v86->regs.gs); - - get_user_ex(vm86->flags, &v86->flags); - get_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &v86->screen_bitmap); - get_user_ex(vm86->cpu_type, &v86->cpu_type); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.es, &user_vm86->regs.es); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.ds, &user_vm86->regs.ds); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.fs, &user_vm86->regs.fs); + get_user_ex(vm86regs.gs, &user_vm86->regs.gs); + + get_user_ex(vm86->flags, &user_vm86->flags); + get_user_ex(vm86->screen_bitmap, &user_vm86->screen_bitmap); + get_user_ex(vm86->cpu_type, &user_vm86->cpu_type); } get_user_catch(err); if (err) return err; - if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int_revectored, &v86->int_revectored, + if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int_revectored, + &user_vm86->int_revectored, sizeof(struct revectored_struct))) return -EFAULT; - if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int21_revectored, &v86->int21_revectored, + if (copy_from_user(&vm86->int21_revectored, + &user_vm86->int21_revectored, sizeof(struct revectored_struct))) return -EFAULT; if (plus) { - if (copy_from_user(&vm86->vm86plus, &v86->vm86plus, + if (copy_from_user(&vm86->vm86plus, &user_vm86->vm86plus, sizeof(struct vm86plus_info_struct))) return -EFAULT; vm86->vm86plus.is_vm86pus = 1; @@ -297,7 +299,7 @@ static long do_sys_vm86(struct vm86plus_struct __user *v86, bool plus) sizeof(struct vm86plus_info_struct)); memcpy(&vm86->regs32, regs, sizeof(struct pt_regs)); - vm86->vm86_info = v86; + vm86->user_vm86 = user_vm86; /* * The flags register is also special: we cannot trust that the user -- 2.4.3 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/