Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751797AbbHEEKW (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Aug 2015 00:10:22 -0400 Received: from mga14.intel.com ([192.55.52.115]:45893 "EHLO mga14.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751602AbbHEEKT (ORCPT ); Wed, 5 Aug 2015 00:10:19 -0400 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.15,613,1432623600"; d="scan'208";a="742410675" From: Xiao Guangrong To: pbonzini@redhat.com Cc: gleb@kernel.org, mtosatti@redhat.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ru.pchel@gmail.com, Xiao Guangrong Subject: [PATCH v2 6/9] KVM: MMU: introduce the framework to check zero bits on sptes Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2015 12:04:24 +0800 Message-Id: <1438747467-25425-7-git-send-email-guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.0 In-Reply-To: <1438747467-25425-1-git-send-email-guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> References: <1438747467-25425-1-git-send-email-guangrong.xiao@linux.intel.com> Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 5097 Lines: 150 We have abstracted the data struct and functions which are used to check reserved bit on guest page tables, now we extend the logic to check zero bits on shadow page tables The zero bits on sptes include not only reserved bits on hardware but also the bits sptes nerve used Signed-off-by: Xiao Guangrong --- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 8 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 3 +++ arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 1 + 4 files changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h index 3e33c0d..09acaa6 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h @@ -294,6 +294,14 @@ struct kvm_mmu { u64 *pae_root; u64 *lm_root; + + /* + * check zero bits on shadow page table entries, these + * bits include not only hardware reserved bits but also + * the bits spte never used. + */ + struct rsvd_bits_validate shadow_zero_check; + struct rsvd_bits_validate guest_rsvd_check; /* diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c index d11d212..edf1ec5 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c @@ -3699,6 +3699,53 @@ static void reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu), execonly); } +/* + * the page table on host is the shadow page table for the page + * table in guest or amd nested guest, its mmu features completely + * follow the features in guest. + */ +void +reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context) +{ + __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_zero_check, + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, + context->shadow_root_level, context->nx, + guest_cpuid_has_gbpages(vcpu), is_pse(vcpu)); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask); + +/* + * the direct page table on host, use as much mmu features as + * possible, however, kvm currently does not do execution-protection. + */ +static void +reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu *context) +{ + if (guest_cpuid_is_amd(vcpu)) + __reset_rsvds_bits_mask(vcpu, &context->shadow_zero_check, + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, + context->shadow_root_level, false, + cpu_has_gbpages, true); + else + __reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check, + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, + false); + +} + +/* + * as the comments in reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask() except it + * is the shadow page table for intel nested guest. + */ +static void +reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, + struct kvm_mmu *context, bool execonly) +{ + __reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(&context->shadow_zero_check, + boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits, execonly); +} + static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *mmu, bool ept) { @@ -3877,6 +3924,7 @@ static void init_kvm_tdp_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, context, false); update_last_pte_bitmap(vcpu, context); + reset_tdp_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context); } void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) @@ -3904,6 +3952,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) context->base_role.smap_andnot_wp = smap && !is_write_protection(vcpu); context->base_role.smm = is_smm(vcpu); + reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_mmu); @@ -3927,6 +3976,7 @@ void kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool execonly) update_permission_bitmask(vcpu, context, true); reset_rsvds_bits_mask_ept(vcpu, context, execonly); + reset_ept_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, context, execonly); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_init_shadow_ept_mmu); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h index 398d21c..2299d15 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h @@ -53,6 +53,9 @@ static inline u64 rsvd_bits(int s, int e) int kvm_mmu_get_spte_hierarchy(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 addr, u64 sptes[4]); void kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(u64 mmio_mask); +void +reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu *context); + /* * Return values of handle_mmio_page_fault_common: * RET_MMIO_PF_EMULATE: it is a real mmio page fault, emulate the instruction diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c index 568cd0f..189e464 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c @@ -2107,6 +2107,7 @@ static void nested_svm_init_mmu_context(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) vcpu->arch.mmu.get_pdptr = nested_svm_get_tdp_pdptr; vcpu->arch.mmu.inject_page_fault = nested_svm_inject_npf_exit; vcpu->arch.mmu.shadow_root_level = get_npt_level(); + reset_shadow_zero_bits_mask(vcpu, &vcpu->arch.mmu); vcpu->arch.walk_mmu = &vcpu->arch.nested_mmu; } -- 2.1.0 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/