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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Date: Tue, 25 Aug 2015 20:38:30 +0200
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+aJJGcG2nRXAH5xgZzd4DiWdDS9cO5ogYM8Cbe5XsQJaA@mail.gmail.com>
Subject: Re: Potential data race in uart_ioctl
To: Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com>
Cc: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@google.com>,
        Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>, linux-serial@vger.kernel.org,
        LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>,
        Kostya Serebryany <kcc@google.com>
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On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 8:32 PM, Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> wrote:
> On Tue, Aug 25, 2015 at 8:26 PM, Peter Hurley <peter@hurleysoftware.com> wrote:
>> Hi Andrey,
>>
>> On 08/25/2015 08:17 AM, Andrey Konovalov wrote:
>>> Hi!
>>>
>>> We are working on a dynamic data race detector for the Linux kernel
>>> called KernelThreadSanitizer (ktsan)
>>> (https://github.com/google/ktsan/wiki).
>>>
>>> While booting the kernel (upstream revision 21bdb584af8c) we got a report:
>>>
>>> ==================================================================
>>> ThreadSanitizer: data-race in uart_ioctl
>>>
>>> Read of size 8 by thread T424 (K971):
>>>  [<ffffffff81673c56>] uart_ioctl+0x36/0x11e0
>>> drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1216
>>>  [<ffffffff81643802>] tty_ioctl+0x4f2/0x11d0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2924
>>>  [<     inlined    >] do_vfs_ioctl+0x44a/0x750 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:43
>>>  [<ffffffff8127b0ca>] do_vfs_ioctl+0x44a/0x750 fs/ioctl.c:607
>>>  [<     inlined    >] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0xa0 SYSC_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:622
>>>  [<ffffffff8127b449>] SyS_ioctl+0x79/0xa0 fs/ioctl.c:613
>>>  [<ffffffff81eae0ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186
>>> DBG: cpu = ffff88063fc1fe68
>>> DBG: cpu id = 0
>>>
>>> Previous write of size 8 by thread T422 (K970):
>>>  [<ffffffff816737ef>] uart_open+0x12f/0x220
>>> drivers/tty/serial/serial_core.c:1629
>>>  [<ffffffff81645be2>] tty_open+0x192/0x8f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2105
>>>  [<ffffffff812628fc>] chrdev_open+0x13c/0x290 fs/char_dev.c:388
>>>  [<ffffffff812582fc>] do_dentry_open+0x3ac/0x550 fs/open.c:736
>>>  [<ffffffff81259d68>] vfs_open+0xb8/0xe0 fs/open.c:853
>>>  [<     inlined    >] path_openat+0x81c/0x2440 do_last fs/namei.c:3163
>>>  [<ffffffff81272f1c>] path_openat+0x81c/0x2440 fs/namei.c:3295
>>>  [<ffffffff8127656a>] do_filp_open+0xfa/0x170 fs/namei.c:3330
>>>  [<ffffffff8125a243>] do_sys_open+0x183/0x2b0 fs/open.c:1025
>>>  [<     inlined    >] SyS_open+0x35/0x50 SYSC_open fs/open.c:1043
>>>  [<ffffffff8125a3a5>] SyS_open+0x35/0x50 fs/open.c:1038
>>>  [<ffffffff81eae0ae>] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0x12/0x71
>>> arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:186
>>> DBG: cpu = ffff88063fd1fe68
>>>
>>> DBG: addr: ffff8801d2a0ce88
>>> DBG: first offset: 0, second offset: 0
>>> DBG: T424 clock: {T424: 211057, T422: 275728}
>>> DBG: T422 clock: {T422: 275819}
>>> ==================================================================
>>>
>>> It seems that one thread reads and uses tty->driver_data while it's
>>> being initialized in another one. The second thread holds port->mutex,
>>> but the first one does a few accesses to tty->driver_data before
>>> locking it.
>>>
>>> Could you confirm if this is a real race?
>>
>> Although I don't understand what triggers ktsan to signal a race
>> condition, this doesn't appear to be an actual race.
>>
>> For an ioctl() syscall to act on any given tty requires a successful
>> open() syscall to have nearly completed (do_sys_open() => fd_install()
>> initializes the file descriptor; ioctl() => fdget() derefs the descriptor).
>>
>> Perhaps what's tripping the race detection is that 2nd and subsequent
>> opens also (redundantly) write the same values as from the first open?
>
> Since we use a fuzzer, yes, it is possible that open is called twice.

Oh, no, sorry, this happens during booting.
The race is on tty_struct, which is probably shared between several
file descriptors.
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