Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754823AbbKQWcl (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Nov 2015 17:32:41 -0500 Received: from mail-io0-f173.google.com ([209.85.223.173]:36025 "EHLO mail-io0-f173.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752735AbbKQWcj (ORCPT ); Tue, 17 Nov 2015 17:32:39 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1446688954-29589-2-git-send-email-samitolvanen@google.com> References: <1446688954-29589-1-git-send-email-samitolvanen@google.com> <1446688954-29589-2-git-send-email-samitolvanen@google.com> Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2015 14:32:38 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: P9yCA8N4MgtbpH8iM272pcZ1ElM Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/4] dm verity: clean up duplicate hashing code From: Kees Cook To: Sami Tolvanen Cc: Mikulas Patocka , Mandeep Baines , Will Drewry , Alasdair Kergon , Mike Snitzer , dm-devel@redhat.com, LKML , Mark Salyzyn Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 13571 Lines: 367 On Wed, Nov 4, 2015 at 6:02 PM, Sami Tolvanen wrote: > Handle dm-verity salting in one place to simplify the code. > > Signed-off-by: Sami Tolvanen Thanks for cleaning this up! Reviewed-by: Kees Cook -Kees > --- > drivers/md/dm-verity.c | 262 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- > 1 file changed, 147 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/md/dm-verity.c b/drivers/md/dm-verity.c > index edc624b..487cb66 100644 > --- a/drivers/md/dm-verity.c > +++ b/drivers/md/dm-verity.c > @@ -173,6 +173,84 @@ static sector_t verity_position_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block, > return block >> (level * v->hash_per_block_bits); > } > > +/* > + * Wrapper for crypto_shash_init, which handles verity salting. > + */ > +static int verity_hash_init(struct dm_verity *v, struct shash_desc *desc) > +{ > + int r; > + > + desc->tfm = v->tfm; > + desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > + > + r = crypto_shash_init(desc); > + > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) { > + DMERR("crypto_shash_init failed: %d", r); > + return r; > + } > + > + if (likely(v->version >= 1)) { > + r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > + > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) { > + DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > + return r; > + } > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static int verity_hash_update(struct dm_verity *v, struct shash_desc *desc, > + const u8 *data, size_t len) > +{ > + int r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data, len); > + > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > + DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > + > + return r; > +} > + > +static int verity_hash_final(struct dm_verity *v, struct shash_desc *desc, > + u8 *digest) > +{ > + int r; > + > + if (unlikely(!v->version)) { > + r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > + > + if (r < 0) { > + DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > + return r; > + } > + } > + > + r = crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); > + > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > + DMERR("crypto_shash_final failed: %d", r); > + > + return r; > +} > + > +static int verity_hash(struct dm_verity *v, struct shash_desc *desc, > + const u8 *data, size_t len, u8 *digest) > +{ > + int r; > + > + r = verity_hash_init(v, desc); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > + return r; > + > + r = verity_hash_update(v, desc, data, len); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > + return r; > + > + return verity_hash_final(v, desc, digest); > +} > + > static void verity_hash_at_level(struct dm_verity *v, sector_t block, int level, > sector_t *hash_block, unsigned *offset) > { > @@ -253,10 +331,10 @@ out: > * If "skip_unverified" is false, unverified buffer is hashed and verified > * against current value of io_want_digest(v, io). > */ > -static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity_io *io, sector_t block, > - int level, bool skip_unverified) > +static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io, > + sector_t block, int level, bool skip_unverified, > + u8 *want_digest) > { > - struct dm_verity *v = io->v; > struct dm_buffer *buf; > struct buffer_aux *aux; > u8 *data; > @@ -273,75 +351,72 @@ static int verity_verify_level(struct dm_verity_io *io, sector_t block, > aux = dm_bufio_get_aux_data(buf); > > if (!aux->hash_verified) { > - struct shash_desc *desc; > - u8 *result; > - > if (skip_unverified) { > r = 1; > goto release_ret_r; > } > > - desc = io_hash_desc(v, io); > - desc->tfm = v->tfm; > - desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > - r = crypto_shash_init(desc); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_init failed: %d", r); > + r = verity_hash(v, io_hash_desc(v, io), > + data, 1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits, > + io_real_digest(v, io)); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > goto release_ret_r; > - } > - > - if (likely(v->version >= 1)) { > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > - goto release_ret_r; > - } > - } > > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, data, 1 << v->hash_dev_block_bits); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > - goto release_ret_r; > - } > - > - if (!v->version) { > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > - goto release_ret_r; > - } > - } > - > - result = io_real_digest(v, io); > - r = crypto_shash_final(desc, result); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_final failed: %d", r); > + if (likely(memcmp(io_real_digest(v, io), want_digest, > + v->digest_size) == 0)) > + aux->hash_verified = 1; > + else if (verity_handle_err(v, > + DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA, > + hash_block)) { > + r = -EIO; > goto release_ret_r; > } > - if (unlikely(memcmp(result, io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size))) { > - if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_METADATA, > - hash_block)) { > - r = -EIO; > - goto release_ret_r; > - } > - } else > - aux->hash_verified = 1; > } > > data += offset; > - > - memcpy(io_want_digest(v, io), data, v->digest_size); > - > - dm_bufio_release(buf); > - return 0; > + memcpy(want_digest, data, v->digest_size); > + r = 0; > > release_ret_r: > dm_bufio_release(buf); > - > return r; > } > > /* > + * Find a hash for a given block, write it to digest and verify the integrity > + * of the hash tree if necessary. > + */ > +static int verity_hash_for_block(struct dm_verity *v, struct dm_verity_io *io, > + sector_t block, u8 *digest) > +{ > + int i; > + int r; > + > + if (likely(v->levels)) { > + /* > + * First, we try to get the requested hash for > + * the current block. If the hash block itself is > + * verified, zero is returned. If it isn't, this > + * function returns 1 and we fall back to whole > + * chain verification. > + */ > + r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, 0, true, digest); > + if (likely(r <= 0)) > + return r; > + } > + > + memcpy(digest, v->root_digest, v->digest_size); > + > + for (i = v->levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > + r = verity_verify_level(v, io, block, i, false, digest); > + if (unlikely(r)) > + return r; > + } > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* > * Verify one "dm_verity_io" structure. > */ > static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io) > @@ -350,54 +425,21 @@ static int verity_verify_io(struct dm_verity_io *io) > struct bio *bio = dm_bio_from_per_bio_data(io, > v->ti->per_bio_data_size); > unsigned b; > - int i; > > for (b = 0; b < io->n_blocks; b++) { > - struct shash_desc *desc; > - u8 *result; > int r; > unsigned todo; > + struct shash_desc *desc = io_hash_desc(v, io); > > - if (likely(v->levels)) { > - /* > - * First, we try to get the requested hash for > - * the current block. If the hash block itself is > - * verified, zero is returned. If it isn't, this > - * function returns 0 and we fall back to whole > - * chain verification. > - */ > - int r = verity_verify_level(io, io->block + b, 0, true); > - if (likely(!r)) > - goto test_block_hash; > - if (r < 0) > - return r; > - } > - > - memcpy(io_want_digest(v, io), v->root_digest, v->digest_size); > - > - for (i = v->levels - 1; i >= 0; i--) { > - int r = verity_verify_level(io, io->block + b, i, false); > - if (unlikely(r)) > - return r; > - } > + r = verity_hash_for_block(v, io, io->block + b, > + io_want_digest(v, io)); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > + return r; > > -test_block_hash: > - desc = io_hash_desc(v, io); > - desc->tfm = v->tfm; > - desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP; > - r = crypto_shash_init(desc); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_init failed: %d", r); > + r = verity_hash_init(v, desc); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > return r; > - } > > - if (likely(v->version >= 1)) { > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > - return r; > - } > - } > todo = 1 << v->data_dev_block_bits; > do { > u8 *page; > @@ -408,37 +450,27 @@ test_block_hash: > len = bv.bv_len; > if (likely(len >= todo)) > len = todo; > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, page + bv.bv_offset, len); > + r = verity_hash_update(v, desc, page + bv.bv_offset, > + len); > kunmap_atomic(page); > > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > return r; > - } > > bio_advance_iter(bio, &io->iter, len); > todo -= len; > } while (todo); > > - if (!v->version) { > - r = crypto_shash_update(desc, v->salt, v->salt_size); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_update failed: %d", r); > - return r; > - } > - } > - > - result = io_real_digest(v, io); > - r = crypto_shash_final(desc, result); > - if (r < 0) { > - DMERR("crypto_shash_final failed: %d", r); > + r = verity_hash_final(v, desc, io_real_digest(v, io)); > + if (unlikely(r < 0)) > return r; > - } > - if (unlikely(memcmp(result, io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size))) { > - if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA, > - io->block + b)) > - return -EIO; > - } > + > + if (likely(memcmp(io_real_digest(v, io), > + io_want_digest(v, io), v->digest_size) == 0)) > + continue; > + else if (verity_handle_err(v, DM_VERITY_BLOCK_TYPE_DATA, > + io->block + b)) > + return -EIO; > } > > return 0; > -- > 2.6.0.rc2.230.g3dd15c0 > -- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/