Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756568AbbKRSoL (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Nov 2015 13:44:11 -0500 Received: from fieldses.org ([173.255.197.46]:39908 "EHLO fieldses.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752988AbbKRSoJ (ORCPT ); Wed, 18 Nov 2015 13:44:09 -0500 Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2015 13:44:08 -0500 To: Al Viro Cc: Austin S Hemmelgarn , Seth Forshee , "Eric W. Biederman" , linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Serge Hallyn , Andy Lutomirski , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Theodore Ts'o" Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Message-ID: <20151118184408.GA806@fieldses.org> References: <1447778351-118699-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <20151117170556.GV22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <20151117172551.GA108807@ubuntu-hedt> <20151117175506.GW22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> <564B79B1.3040207@gmail.com> <20151117193012.GX22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20151117193012.GX22011@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) From: bfields@fieldses.org (J. Bruce Fields) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1624 Lines: 33 On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 07:30:12PM +0000, Al Viro wrote: > On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 02:02:09PM -0500, Austin S Hemmelgarn wrote: > > > >_Static_ attacks, or change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks? > > To properly protect against attacks on mounted filesystems, we'd > > need some new concept of a userspace immutable file (that is, one > > where nobody can write to it except the kernel, and only the kernel > > can change it between regular access and this new state), and then > > have the kernel set an image (or block device) to this state when a > > filesystem is mounted from it (this introduces all kinds of other > > issues too however, for example stuff that allows an online fsck on > > the device will stop working, as will many un-deletion tools). > > > > The only other option would be to force the FS to cache all metadata > > in memory, and validate between the cache and what's on disk on > > every access, which is not realistic for any real world system. > > Doctor, it hurt when I do it... > > IOW, the other option is to refuse attempting this insanity. Fuse probably > can be handled, but being able to mount (with kernel-space drivera) an > arbitrary ext4 image is equivalent to being able to do anything and it's > going to stay that way for the forseeable future. What about the filesystems that desktop users commonly mount? (fat, isofs, udf?) --b. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/