Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752034AbbKZHIC (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Nov 2015 02:08:02 -0500 Received: from ozlabs.org ([103.22.144.67]:57636 "EHLO ozlabs.org" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1750759AbbKZHIA (ORCPT ); Thu, 26 Nov 2015 02:08:00 -0500 Message-ID: <1448521677.19291.3.camel@ellerman.id.au> Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow customizable random offset to mmap_base address. From: Michael Ellerman To: Andrew Morton , Daniel Cashman Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux@arm.linux.org.uk, keescook@chromium.org, mingo@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, corbet@lwn.net, dzickus@redhat.com, ebiederm@xmission.com, xypron.glpk@gmx.de, jpoimboe@redhat.com, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, n-horiguchi@ah.jp.nec.com, aarcange@redhat.com, mgorman@suse.de, tglx@linutronix.de, rientjes@google.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, salyzyn@android.com, jeffv@google.com, nnk@google.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com, will.deacon@arm.com, hpa@zytor.com, x86@kernel.org, hecmargi@upv.es, bp@suse.de, dcashman@google.com, Ralf Baechle , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Heiko Carstens , Martin Schwidefsky Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 18:07:57 +1100 In-Reply-To: <20151124163907.1a406b79458b1bb0d3519684@linux-foundation.org> References: <1447888808-31571-1-git-send-email-dcashman@android.com> <20151124163907.1a406b79458b1bb0d3519684@linux-foundation.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" X-Mailer: Evolution 3.16.5-1ubuntu3 Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 4372 Lines: 118 On Tue, 2015-11-24 at 16:39 -0800, Andrew Morton wrote: > On Wed, 18 Nov 2015 15:20:04 -0800 Daniel Cashman wrote: > > Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) provides a barrier to > > exploitation of user-space processes in the presence of security > > vulnerabilities by making it more difficult to find desired code/data > > which could help an attack. This is done by adding a random offset to the > > location of regions in the process address space, with a greater range of > > potential offset values corresponding to better protection/a larger > > search-space for brute force, but also to greater potential for > > fragmentation. > > mips, powerpc and s390 also implement arch_mmap_rnd(). Are there any > special considerations here, or it just a matter of maintainers wiring > it up and testing it? I had a quick stab at powerpc. It seems to work OK, though I've only tested on 64-bit 64K pages. I'll update this when Daniel does a version which supports a DEFAULT for both MIN values. cheers >From 7c42636d5df21203977900d283c722116f06310c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Michael Ellerman Date: Thu, 26 Nov 2015 17:40:00 +1100 Subject: [PATCH] powerpc/mm: Use ARCH_MMCAP_RND_BITS Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman --- arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c | 12 +++++++----- 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig index db49e0d796b1..e796d6c4055c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig @@ -27,6 +27,36 @@ config MMU bool default y +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN + # On 64-bit up to 1G of address space (2^30) + default 12 if 64BIT && PPC_256K_PAGES # 256K (2^18), = 30 - 18 = 12 + default 14 if 64BIT && PPC_64K_PAGES # 64K (2^16), = 30 - 16 = 14 + default 16 if 64BIT && PPC_16K_PAGES # 16K (2^14), = 30 - 14 = 16 + default 18 if 64BIT # 4K (2^12), = 30 - 12 = 18 + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX + # On 64-bit up to 32T of address space (2^45) + default 27 if 64BIT && PPC_256K_PAGES # 256K (2^18), = 45 - 18 = 27 + default 29 if 64BIT && PPC_64K_PAGES # 64K (2^16), = 45 - 16 = 29 + default 31 if 64BIT && PPC_16K_PAGES # 16K (2^14), = 45 - 14 = 31 + default 33 if 64BIT # 4K (2^12), = 45 - 12 = 33 + default ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN + # Up to 8MB of address space (2^23) + default 5 if PPC_256K_PAGES # 256K (2^18), = 23 - 18 = 5 + default 7 if PPC_64K_PAGES # 64K (2^16), = 23 - 16 = 7 + default 9 if PPC_16K_PAGES # 16K (2^14), = 23 - 14 = 9 + default 11 # 4K (2^12), = 23 - 12 = 11 + +config ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX + # Up to 2G of address space (2^31) + default 13 if PPC_256K_PAGES # 256K (2^18), = 31 - 18 = 13 + default 15 if PPC_64K_PAGES # 64K (2^16), = 31 - 16 = 15 + default 17 if PPC_16K_PAGES # 16K (2^14), = 31 - 14 = 17 + default 19 # 4K (2^12), = 31 - 12 = 19 + config HAVE_SETUP_PER_CPU_AREA def_bool PPC64 @@ -160,6 +190,8 @@ config PPC select EDAC_ATOMIC_SCRUB select ARCH_HAS_DMA_SET_COHERENT_MASK select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS + select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT config GENERIC_CSUM def_bool CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN diff --git a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c index 0f0502e12f6c..269f7bcd2702 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/mm/mmap.c @@ -55,13 +55,15 @@ static inline int mmap_is_legacy(void) unsigned long arch_mmap_rnd(void) { - unsigned long rnd; + unsigned long shift, rnd; - /* 8MB for 32bit, 1GB for 64bit */ + shift = mmap_rnd_bits; +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT if (is_32bit_task()) - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(23-PAGE_SHIFT)); - else - rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1<<(30-PAGE_SHIFT)); + shift = mmap_rnd_compat_bits; +#endif + + rnd = (unsigned long)get_random_int() % (1 << shift); return rnd << PAGE_SHIFT; } -- 2.5.0 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/