Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1752193AbbLEGRp (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Dec 2015 01:17:45 -0500 Received: from mail-io0-f176.google.com ([209.85.223.176]:32877 "EHLO mail-io0-f176.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751882AbbLEGRb (ORCPT ); Sat, 5 Dec 2015 01:17:31 -0500 Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 00:15:58 -0600 From: Seth Forshee To: "Serge E. Hallyn" Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" , "Serge E. Hallyn" , "Eric W. Biederman" , Alexander Viro , Serge Hallyn , Richard Weinberger , Austin S Hemmelgarn , Miklos Szeredi , linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH 14/19] fs: Permit FIBMAP for users with CAP_SYS_RAWIO in s_user_ns Message-ID: <20151205061558.GA14580@ubuntu-hedt> References: <1449070821-73820-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <1449070821-73820-15-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> <20151204191143.GE3624@mail.hallyn.com> <20151204200528.GC18359@thunk.org> <20151204200736.GJ3624@mail.hallyn.com> <20151204204532.GG147214@ubuntu-hedt> <20151204231152.GE18359@thunk.org> <20151204234348.GA6908@mail.hallyn.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20151204234348.GA6908@mail.hallyn.com> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.21 (2010-09-15) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1398 Lines: 26 On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 05:43:49PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 06:11:52PM -0500, Theodore Ts'o wrote: > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:45:32PM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote: > > > On Fri, Dec 04, 2015 at 02:07:36PM -0600, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > > > > Heh, I was looking over http://www.gossamer-threads.com/lists/linux/kernel/103611 > > > > a little while ago :) The same question was asked 16 years ago. Apparently > > > > the answer then was that it was easier than fixing the code. > > > > > > So it seems then that either it still isn't safe and so unprivileged > > > users shouldn't be allowed to do it at all, or else it's safe and we > > > should drop the requirement completely. I can't say which is right, > > > unfortunately. > > > > It may not have been safe 16 years agoo, but giving invalid arguments > > to FIBMAP is safe for ext4 and ext2. This is the sort of thing that > > tools like trinity should and does test for, so I think it should be > > fine to remove the root check for FIBMAP. > > Seth, can I tempt you into sending a standalone patch to remove that? :) Patch sent. I'll drop this patch in v2. -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/