Date: Mon, 14 Dec 2015 19:39:54 +0000
From: One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
To: Jason Newton <nevion@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Is PROT_SOCK still relevant?
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> Perhaps lets consider this in another way if it is strongly held that
> this is worth while in the default configuration: can it default off
> in the context of selinux / other security frameworks (preferably
> based on their detection and/or controllably settable at runtime)?
> Those allow more powerful and finer grain control and don't need this
> to be there as they already provide auditing on what operations and
> port numbers should be allowed by what programs.

That would be a regression and a very very bad one to have. The defaults
need to always be the same as before - or stronger and never go back
towards insecurity, otherwise they could make things less safe.

> Or how about letting port number concerns be handled by those security
> frameworks all together considering it is limited security?

There are already half a dozen different ways to handle it from xinetd
through setcap, to systemd spawning it, to iptables.

Alan
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