Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S933519AbcDLQ5u (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2016 12:57:50 -0400 Received: from mail-wm0-f44.google.com ([74.125.82.44]:36105 "EHLO mail-wm0-f44.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756207AbcDLQ5r (ORCPT ); Tue, 12 Apr 2016 12:57:47 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1459988437-3429-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> Date: Tue, 12 Apr 2016 09:57:45 -0700 X-Google-Sender-Auth: EGK6sN1Ggxm1wHBw-S6lpWc6kao Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/6] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading restrictions From: Kees Cook To: James Morris Cc: Andrew Morton , Joe Perches , Mimi Zohar , Andy Shevchenko , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kalle Valo , Mauro Carvalho Chehab , Guenter Roeck , Jiri Slaby , Paul Moore , Stephen Smalley , Casey Schaufler , Andreas Gruenbacher , Rasmus Villemoes , Ulf Hansson , Vitaly Kuznetsov , linux-security-module , LKML Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 677 Lines: 20 On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 2:59 AM, James Morris wrote: > On Wed, 6 Apr 2016, Kees Cook wrote: > >> This provides the mini-LSM "loadpin" that intercepts the now consolidated >> kernel_file_read LSM hook so that a system can keep all loads coming from >> a single trusted filesystem. This is what Chrome OS uses to pin kernel >> module and firmware loading to the read-only crypto-verified dm-verity >> partition so that kernel module signing is not needed. >> > > This all looks good to me, just waiting now for the const fix suggested by > Joe. Okay, great, thanks! I've sent a v4 with the const change now. -Kees -- Kees Cook Chrome OS & Brillo Security