Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753889AbcDTOrs (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Apr 2016 10:47:48 -0400 Received: from mail-ob0-f170.google.com ([209.85.214.170]:34250 "EHLO mail-ob0-f170.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751927AbcDTOrq (ORCPT ); Wed, 20 Apr 2016 10:47:46 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20160420080821.GB7071@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> References: <1460999679-30805-1-git-send-email-thgarnie@google.com> <20160419071528.GA1624@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> <20160420080821.GB7071@js1304-P5Q-DELUXE> Date: Wed, 20 Apr 2016 07:47:44 -0700 Message-ID: Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] mm: SLAB freelist randomization From: Thomas Garnier To: Joonsoo Kim Cc: Christoph Lameter , Pekka Enberg , David Rientjes , Andrew Morton , Kees Cook , Greg Thelen , Laura Abbott , kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, LKML , Linux-MM Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 18449 Lines: 456 On Wed, Apr 20, 2016 at 1:08 AM, Joonsoo Kim wrote: > On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 09:44:54AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: >> On Tue, Apr 19, 2016 at 12:15 AM, Joonsoo Kim wrote: >> > On Mon, Apr 18, 2016 at 10:14:39AM -0700, Thomas Garnier wrote: >> >> Provides an optional config (CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM) to randomize the >> >> SLAB freelist. The list is randomized during initialization of a new set >> >> of pages. The order on different freelist sizes is pre-computed at boot >> >> for performance. This security feature reduces the predictability of the >> >> kernel SLAB allocator against heap overflows rendering attacks much less >> >> stable. >> > >> > I'm not familiar on security but it doesn't look much secure than >> > before. Is there any other way to generate different sequence of freelist >> > for each new set of pages? Current approach using pre-computed array will >> > generate same sequence of freelist for all new set of pages having same size >> > class. Is it sufficient? >> > >> >> I think it is sufficient. There is a tradeoff for performance. We could randomly >> pick an object from the freelist every time (on slab_get_obj) but I >> think it will >> have significant impact (at least 3%). >> >> >> For example this attack against SLUB (also applicable against SLAB) >> >> would be affected: >> >> https://jon.oberheide.org/blog/2010/09/10/linux-kernel-can-slub-overflow/ >> >> >> >> Also, since v4.6 the freelist was moved at the end of the SLAB. It means >> >> a controllable heap is opened to new attacks not yet publicly discussed. >> >> A kernel heap overflow can be transformed to multiple use-after-free. >> >> This feature makes this type of attack harder too. >> >> >> >> To generate entropy, we use get_random_bytes_arch because 0 bits of >> >> entropy is available at that boot stage. In the worse case this function >> >> will fallback to the get_random_bytes sub API. >> >> >> >> The config option name is not specific to the SLAB as this approach will >> >> be extended to other allocators like SLUB. >> > >> > If this feature will be applied to the SLUB, it's better to put common >> > code to mm/slab_common.c. >> > >> >> I think it might be moved there once we implement the SLUB counterpart >> but it is too early to define which part will be common. >> >> >> >> >> Performance results highlighted no major changes: >> >> >> >> Netperf average on 10 runs: >> >> >> >> threads,base,change >> >> 16,576943.10,585905.90 (101.55%) >> >> 32,564082.00,569741.20 (101.00%) >> >> 48,558334.30,561851.20 (100.63%) >> >> 64,552025.20,556448.30 (100.80%) >> >> 80,552294.40,551743.10 (99.90%) >> >> 96,552435.30,547529.20 (99.11%) >> >> 112,551320.60,550183.20 (99.79%) >> >> 128,549138.30,550542.70 (100.26%) >> >> 144,549344.50,544529.10 (99.12%) >> >> 160,550360.80,539929.30 (98.10%) >> >> >> >> slab_test 1 run on boot. After is faster except for odd result on size >> >> 2048. >> > >> > Hmm... It's odd result. It adds more logic and it should >> > decrease performance. I guess it would be experimental error but >> > do you have any analysis about this result? >> > >> >> I don't. I am glad to redo the test. I found that slab_test has very different >> result based on the heap state at the time of the test. If I run the >> test multiple >> times, I have really various results on with or without the mitigation (on >> dedicated hardware). >> >> >> >> >> Before: >> >> >> >> Single thread testing >> >> ===================== >> >> 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 137 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 118 cycles kfree -> 119 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 112 cycles kfree -> 119 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 126 cycles kfree -> 123 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 135 cycles kfree -> 131 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 165 cycles kfree -> 104 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 174 cycles kfree -> 126 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 242 cycles kfree -> 160 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 478 cycles kfree -> 239 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 747 cycles kfree -> 364 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 774 cycles kfree -> 404 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 849 cycles kfree -> 430 cycles >> >> 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 118 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 118 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 118 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 121 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 118 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> >> >> After: >> >> >> >> Single thread testing >> >> ===================== >> >> 1. Kmalloc: Repeatedly allocate then free test >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8) -> 99 cycles kfree -> 84 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16) -> 88 cycles kfree -> 83 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(32) -> 90 cycles kfree -> 81 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(64) -> 107 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(128) -> 134 cycles kfree -> 89 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(256) -> 145 cycles kfree -> 97 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(512) -> 177 cycles kfree -> 116 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(1024) -> 223 cycles kfree -> 151 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(2048) -> 1429 cycles kfree -> 221 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(4096) -> 720 cycles kfree -> 348 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8192) -> 788 cycles kfree -> 393 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16384) -> 867 cycles kfree -> 433 cycles >> >> 2. Kmalloc: alloc/free test >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(32)/kfree -> 115 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(64)/kfree -> 120 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(128)/kfree -> 127 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(256)/kfree -> 119 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(512)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(1024)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(2048)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(4096)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(8192)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> 10000 times kmalloc(16384)/kfree -> 112 cycles >> >> >> >> Signed-off-by: Thomas Garnier >> >> --- >> >> Based on next-20160418 >> >> --- >> >> init/Kconfig | 9 ++++ >> >> mm/slab.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- >> >> 2 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> >> >> diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig >> >> index 0dfd09d..ee35418 100644 >> >> --- a/init/Kconfig >> >> +++ b/init/Kconfig >> >> @@ -1742,6 +1742,15 @@ config SLOB >> >> >> >> endchoice >> >> >> >> +config FREELIST_RANDOM >> >> + default n >> >> + depends on SLAB >> >> + bool "SLAB freelist randomization" >> >> + help >> >> + Randomizes the freelist order used on creating new SLABs. This >> >> + security feature reduces the predictability of the kernel slab >> >> + allocator against heap overflows. >> >> + >> >> config SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL >> >> default y >> >> depends on SLUB && SMP >> >> diff --git a/mm/slab.c b/mm/slab.c >> >> index b70aabf..8371d80 100644 >> >> --- a/mm/slab.c >> >> +++ b/mm/slab.c >> >> @@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ >> >> #include >> >> #include >> >> #include >> >> +#include >> >> >> >> #include >> >> >> >> @@ -1229,6 +1230,62 @@ static void __init set_up_node(struct kmem_cache *cachep, int index) >> >> } >> >> } >> >> >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM >> >> +/* >> >> + * Master lists are pre-computed random lists >> >> + * Lists of different sizes are used to optimize performance on SLABS with >> >> + * different object counts. >> >> + */ >> > >> > If it is for optimization, it would be one option to have separate >> > random list for each kmem_cache. It would consume more memory but it >> > would be marginal. And, it provides more un-predictability and it can >> > give better performance because we don't need state->type (more, less) >> > and special handling related for it. >> > >> >> I am not sur because major caches are created early at boot time. We still have >> the same entropy problem and we are wasting a bit more memory. It will be faster > > I think that entropy problem is another issue. It should be considered > separately. If it is solved, making per-computed array for each > kmem_cache will provide more un-predictability. If someone who succeed to > exploit some kmem_cache with 128 object per slab want to exploit > another kmem_cache with 128 object per slab, this separate pre-computed array > will be helpful. > >> on usage though but not sure it will be significant. > > I also think it's not significant. But, besides performance effect, > code doesn't look very attractive and extendable. In case of SLUB, > there is setup_slub_max_order option and object per slab could be larger > than 256. To deal with it, we need to add many more static definition > and it looks not good to me. Please use dynamic allocated memory > instead of static array definition. > You don't need to. We wrap the list used (if you look at get_next_entry we reset at pos 0 when we arrive to the list size). I do think that the design will be better with a dedicated list per cache. Given you seem fine with the memory differences, performance can only get better... I will refactor for that on the next iteration. >> >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_2[2]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_4[4]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_8[8]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_16[16]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_32[32]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_64[64]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_128[128]; >> >> +static freelist_idx_t master_list_256[256]; >> >> +const static struct m_list { >> >> + size_t count; >> >> + freelist_idx_t *list; >> >> +} master_lists[] = { >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_2), master_list_2 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_4), master_list_4 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_8), master_list_8 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_16), master_list_16 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_32), master_list_32 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_64), master_list_64 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_128), master_list_128 }, >> >> + { ARRAY_SIZE(master_list_256), master_list_256 }, >> >> +}; >> >> + >> >> +/* Pre-compute the Freelist master lists at boot */ >> >> +static void __init freelist_random_init(void) >> >> +{ >> >> + unsigned int seed; >> >> + size_t z, i, rand; >> >> + struct rnd_state slab_rand; >> >> + >> >> + get_random_bytes_arch(&seed, sizeof(seed)); >> >> + prandom_seed_state(&slab_rand, seed); >> >> + >> >> + for (z = 0; z < ARRAY_SIZE(master_lists); z++) { >> >> + for (i = 0; i < master_lists[z].count; i++) >> >> + master_lists[z].list[i] = i; >> >> + >> >> + /* Fisher-Yates shuffle */ >> >> + for (i = master_lists[z].count - 1; i > 0; i--) { >> >> + rand = prandom_u32_state(&slab_rand); >> >> + rand %= (i + 1); >> >> + swap(master_lists[z].list[i], >> >> + master_lists[z].list[rand]); >> >> + } >> >> + } >> >> +} >> >> +#else >> >> +static inline void __init freelist_random_init(void) { } >> >> +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */ >> >> + >> >> + >> >> /* >> >> * Initialisation. Called after the page allocator have been initialised and >> >> * before smp_init(). >> >> @@ -1255,6 +1312,8 @@ void __init kmem_cache_init(void) >> >> if (!slab_max_order_set && totalram_pages > (32 << 20) >> PAGE_SHIFT) >> >> slab_max_order = SLAB_MAX_ORDER_HI; >> >> >> >> + freelist_random_init(); >> >> + >> >> /* Bootstrap is tricky, because several objects are allocated >> >> * from caches that do not exist yet: >> >> * 1) initialize the kmem_cache cache: it contains the struct >> >> @@ -2442,6 +2501,107 @@ static void cache_init_objs_debug(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page) >> >> #endif >> >> } >> >> >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM >> >> +/* Identify if the target freelist matches the pre-computed list */ >> >> +enum master_type { >> >> + match, >> >> + less, >> >> + more >> >> +}; >> >> + >> >> +/* Hold information during a freelist initialization */ >> >> +struct freelist_init_state { >> >> + unsigned int padding; >> >> + unsigned int pos; >> >> + unsigned int count; >> >> + struct m_list master_list; >> >> + unsigned int master_count; >> >> + enum master_type type; >> >> +}; >> >> + >> >> +/* Select the right pre-computed master list and initialize state */ >> >> +static void freelist_state_initialize(struct freelist_init_state *state, >> >> + unsigned int count) >> >> +{ >> >> + unsigned int idx; >> >> + const unsigned int last_idx = ARRAY_SIZE(master_lists) - 1; >> >> + >> >> + memset(state, 0, sizeof(*state)); >> >> + state->count = count; >> >> + state->pos = 0; >> > >> > Using pos = 0 here looks not good in terms of security. In this case, >> > every new page having same size class have same sequence of freelist since boot. >> > >> > How about using random value to set pos? It provides some more randomness >> > with minimal overhead. >> > >> >> I think it is a good idea. I will add that for the next iteration. >> >> >> + /* count is always >= 2 */ >> >> + idx = ilog2(count) - 1; >> >> + if (idx >= last_idx) >> >> + idx = last_idx; >> >> + else if (roundup_pow_of_two(idx + 1) != count) >> >> + idx++; >> >> + state->master_list = master_lists[idx]; >> >> + if (state->master_list.count == state->count) >> >> + state->type = match; >> >> + else if (state->master_list.count > state->count) >> >> + state->type = more; >> >> + else >> >> + state->type = less; >> >> +} >> >> + >> >> +/* Get the next entry on the master list depending on the target list size */ >> >> +static freelist_idx_t get_next_entry(struct freelist_init_state *state) >> >> +{ >> >> + if (state->type == less && state->pos == state->master_list.count) { >> >> + state->padding += state->pos; >> >> + state->pos = 0; >> >> + } >> >> + BUG_ON(state->pos >= state->master_list.count); >> >> + return state->master_list.list[state->pos++]; >> >> +} >> >> + >> >> +static freelist_idx_t next_random_slot(struct freelist_init_state *state) >> >> +{ >> >> + freelist_idx_t cur, entry; >> >> + >> >> + entry = get_next_entry(state); >> >> + >> >> + if (state->type != match) { >> >> + while ((entry + state->padding) >= state->count) >> >> + entry = get_next_entry(state); >> >> + cur = entry + state->padding; >> >> + BUG_ON(cur >= state->count); >> >> + } else { >> >> + cur = entry; >> >> + } >> >> + >> >> + return cur; >> >> +} >> >> + >> >> +/* Shuffle the freelist initialization state based on pre-computed lists */ >> >> +static void shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *cachep, struct page *page, >> >> + unsigned int count) >> >> +{ >> >> + unsigned int i; >> >> + struct freelist_init_state state; >> >> + >> >> + if (count < 2) { >> >> + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) >> >> + set_free_obj(page, i, i); >> >> + return; >> >> + } >> >> + >> >> + /* Last chunk is used already in this case */ >> >> + if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep)) >> >> + count--; >> >> + >> >> + freelist_state_initialize(&state, count); >> >> + for (i = 0; i < count; i++) >> >> + set_free_obj(page, i, next_random_slot(&state)); >> >> + >> >> + if (OBJFREELIST_SLAB(cachep)) >> >> + set_free_obj(page, i, i); >> > >> > Please consider last object of OBJFREELIST_SLAB cache, too. >> > >> > freelist_state_init() >> > last_obj = next_randome_slot() >> > page->freelist = XXX >> > for (i = 0; i < count - 1; i++) >> > set_free_obj() >> > set_free_obj(last_obj); >> > >> > Thanks. >> > >> >> The current implementation take the last chunk by default before the >> freelist is initialized. Do you want it to be randomized as well? > > Yes. > > Thanks. > >> >> >> +} >> >> +#else >> >> +static inline void shuffle_freelist(struct kmem_cache *cachep, >> >> + struct page *page, unsigned int count) { } >> >> +#endif /* CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM */ >> >> + >> >> static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep, >> >> struct page *page) >> >> { >> >> @@ -2464,8 +2624,12 @@ static void cache_init_objs(struct kmem_cache *cachep, >> >> kasan_poison_object_data(cachep, objp); >> >> } >> >> >> >> - set_free_obj(page, i, i); >> >> + /* If enabled, initialization is done in shuffle_freelist */ >> >> + if (!config_enabled(CONFIG_FREELIST_RANDOM)) >> >> + set_free_obj(page, i, i); >> >> } >> >> + >> >> + shuffle_freelist(cachep, page, cachep->num); >> >> } >> >> >> >> static void kmem_flagcheck(struct kmem_cache *cachep, gfp_t flags) >> >> -- >> >> 2.8.0.rc3.226.g39d4020 >> >> >> >> -- >> >> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in >> >> the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, >> >> see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . >> >> Don't email: email@kvack.org >> >> -- >> To unsubscribe, send a message with 'unsubscribe linux-mm' in >> the body to majordomo@kvack.org. For more info on Linux MM, >> see: http://www.linux-mm.org/ . >> Don't email: email@kvack.org