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Date: Thu, 21 Apr 2016 10:20:43 +1000 (AEST)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>, Joe Perches <joe@perches.com>,
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Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 0/6] LSM: LoadPin for kernel file loading
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On Wed, 20 Apr 2016, Kees Cook wrote:

> This provides the mini-LSM "loadpin" that intercepts the now consolidated
> kernel_file_read LSM hook so that a system can keep all loads coming from
> a single trusted filesystem. This is what Chrome OS uses to pin kernel
> module and firmware loading to the read-only crypto-verified dm-verity
> partition so that kernel module signing is not needed.
> 

Applied to
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security.git next


-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>