Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1753190AbcDZVwl (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Apr 2016 17:52:41 -0400 Received: from atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz ([195.113.26.193]:50055 "EHLO atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751885AbcDZVwk (ORCPT ); Tue, 26 Apr 2016 17:52:40 -0400 Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 23:52:36 +0200 From: Pavel Machek To: One Thousand Gnomes Cc: Andy Lutomirski , Jarkko Sakkinen , Greg KH , Andy Lutomirski , Borislav Petkov , Boris Ostrovsky , "open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" , Ingo Molnar , Kristen Carlson Accardi , "open list:DOCUMENTATION" , open list , Mathias Krause , Thomas Gleixner , Wan Zongshun Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions Message-ID: <20160426215236.GA1605@amd> References: <1461605698-12385-1-git-send-email-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com> <20160426190009.GC8162@amd> <20160426194117.GA11111@amd> <20160426201154.GC11111@amd> <20160426215952.44ff82a6@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20160426215952.44ff82a6@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk> User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.23 (2014-03-12) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1216 Lines: 33 On Tue 2016-04-26 21:59:52, One Thousand Gnomes wrote: > > But... that will mean that my ssh will need to be SGX-aware, and that > > I will not be able to switch to AMD machine in future. ... or to other > > Intel machine for that matter, right? > > I'm not privy to AMD's CPU design plans. > > However I think for the ssl/ssh case you'd use the same interfaces > currently available for plugging in TPMs and dongles. It's a solved > problem in the crypto libraries. > > > What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support? > > I don't see why you'd need new syscalls. So the kernel will implement few selected crypto algorithms, similar to what TPM would provide, using SGX, and then userspace no longer needs to know about SGX? Ok, I guess that's simple. It also means it is boring, and the multiuser-game-of-the-day will not be able to protect the (plain text) password from the cold boot attack. Nor will be emacs be able to protect in-memory copy of my diary from cold boot attack. So I guess yes, some new syscalls would be nice :-). Pavel -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html