Date: Wed, 27 Apr 2016 10:18:05 +0200
From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
        "linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
        Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
        Greg KH <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
        Mathias Krause <minipli@googlemail.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
        "open list:STAGING SUBSYSTEM" <devel@driverdev.osuosl.org>,
        Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>,
        Wan Zongshun <Vincent.Wan@amd.com>,
        Kristen Carlson Accardi <kristen@linux.intel.com>,
        open list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
        Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
        "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Peter Zijlstra <a.p.zijlstra@chello.nl>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6] Intel Secure Guard Extensions
Message-ID: <20160427081804.GC16991@gmail.com>
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* Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> wrote:

> > What new syscalls would be needed for ssh to get all this support?
> 
> This patchset or similar, plus some user code and an enclave to use.
> 
> Sadly, on current CPUs, you also need Intel to bless the enclave.  It looks like 
> new CPUs might relax that requirement.

That looks like a fundamental technical limitation in my book - to an open source 
user this is essentially a very similar capability as tboot: it only allows the 
execution of externally blessed static binary blobs...

I don't think we can merge any of this upstream until it's clear that the hardware 
owner running open-source user-space can also freely define/start his own secure 
enclaves without having to sign the enclave with any external party. I.e. 
self-signed enclaves should be fundamentally supported as well.

Thanks,

	Ingo