Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S263130AbTEBWf0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 May 2003 18:35:26 -0400 Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org id S263192AbTEBWf0 (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 May 2003 18:35:26 -0400 Received: from siaab2ab.compuserve.com ([149.174.40.130]:35992 "EHLO siaab2ab.compuserve.com") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S263130AbTEBWfZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 2 May 2003 18:35:25 -0400 Date: Fri, 2 May 2003 18:46:20 -0400 From: Chuck Ebbert <76306.1226@compuserve.com> Subject: Re: [Announcement] "Exec Shield", new Linux security feature To: John Bradford Cc: linux-kernel Message-ID: <200305021847_MC3-1-3725-A1B@compuserve.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Content-Length: 1114 Lines: 24 John Bradford wrote: > Slightly off-topic, but does anybody know whether IA64 or x86-64 allow > you to make the stack non-executable in the same way you can on SPARC? IA64 supports a mind-boggling variety of page-level protection modes, including execute-only pages that usermode can jump to and get 'promoted' to lower (more privileged) levels. _And_ it supports protection keys that can be attached to pages so your process needs to have the key loaded into a register to touch those pages. The keys can themselves be marked read/write/execute disable on loading, so the supervisor can give you a key that keeps you from executing pages even if their page-level protections would otherwise allow it. AMD64 supports a simple NX (no execute) bit that keeps both supervisor and user code from executing, and that's probably all anyone really needs. ------ Chuck - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/