Subject: Re: Summary of LPC guest MSI discussion in Santa Fe
To: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
        Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
References: <1478209178-3009-1-git-send-email-eric.auger@redhat.com>
 <20161103220205.37715b49@t450s.home> <20161108024559.GA20591@arm.com>
Cc: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>, eric.auger.pro@gmail.com,
        christoffer.dall@linaro.org, marc.zyngier@arm.com,
        robin.murphy@arm.com, joro@8bytes.org, tglx@linutronix.de,
        jason@lakedaemon.net, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
        kvm@vger.kernel.org, drjones@redhat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
        pranav.sawargaonkar@gmail.com, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
        punit.agrawal@arm.com, diana.craciun@nxp.com, benh@kernel.crashing.org,
        arnd@arndb.de, jcm@redhat.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk
From: Don Dutile <ddutile@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <5821F701.3080501@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2016 11:02:09 -0500
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On 11/07/2016 09:45 PM, Will Deacon wrote:
> Hi all,
>
> I figured this was a reasonable post to piggy-back on for the LPC minutes
> relating to guest MSIs on arm64.
>
> On Thu, Nov 03, 2016 at 10:02:05PM -0600, Alex Williamson wrote:
>> We can always have QEMU reject hot-adding the device if the reserved
>> region overlaps existing guest RAM, but I don't even really see how we
>> advise users to give them a reasonable chance of avoiding that
>> possibility.  Apparently there are also ARM platforms where MSI pages
>> cannot be remapped to support the previous programmable user/VM
>> address, is it even worthwhile to support those platforms?  Does that
>> decision influence whether user programmable MSI reserved regions are
>> really a second class citizen to fixed reserved regions?  I expect
>> we'll be talking about this tomorrow morning, but I certainly haven't
>> come up with any viable solutions to this.  Thanks,
>
> At LPC last week, we discussed guest MSIs on arm64 as part of the PCI
> microconference. I presented some slides to illustrate some of the issues
> we're trying to solve:
>
>    http://www.willdeacon.ukfsn.org/bitbucket/lpc-16/msi-in-guest-arm64.pdf
>
> Punit took some notes (thanks!) on the etherpad here:
>
>    https://etherpad.openstack.org/p/LPC2016_PCI
>
> although the discussion was pretty lively and jumped about, so I've had
> to go from memory where the notes didn't capture everything that was
> said.
>
> To summarise, arm64 platforms differ in their handling of MSIs when compared
> to x86:
>
>    1. The physical memory map is not standardised (Jon pointed out that
>       this is something that was realised late on)
>    2. MSIs are usually treated the same as DMA writes, in that they must be
>       mapped by the SMMU page tables so that they target a physical MSI
>       doorbell
>    3. On some platforms, MSIs bypass the SMMU entirely (e.g. due to an MSI
>       doorbell built into the PCI RC)
Chaulk this case to 'the learning curve'.
Q35 chipset (the one being use for x86-PCIe qemu model) had no intr-remap hw,
only DMA addrs destined for real memory. assigned-device intrs had to be caught
by kvm & injected into guests, and yes, a DoS was possible... and thus,
the intr-remap support being done after initial iommu support.


>    4. Platforms typically have some set of addresses that abort before
>       reaching the SMMU (e.g. because the PCI identifies them as P2P).
ARM platforms that don't implement the equivalent of ACS (in PCI bridges within
a PCIe switch) are either not device-assignment capable, or the IOMMU domain
expands across the entire peer-to-peer (sub-)tree.
ACS(-like) functionality is a fundamental component to the security model,
as is the IOMMU itself.  Without it, it's equivalent to not having an IOMMU.

Dare I ask?: Can these systems, or parts of these systems, just be deemed
"incomplete" or "not 100% secure" wrt device assignment, and other systems
can or will be ???
Not much different then the first x86 systems that tried to get it right
the first few times... :-/
I'm hearing (parts of) systems that are just not properly designed
for device-assignment use-case, probably b/c this (system) architecture
hasn't been pulled together from the variouis component architectures
(CPU, SMMU, IOT, etc.).

>
> All of this means that userspace (QEMU) needs to identify the memory
> regions corresponding to points (3) and (4) and ensure that they are
> not allocated in the guest physical (IPA) space. For platforms that can
> remap the MSI doorbell as in (2), then some space also needs to be
> allocated for that.
>
Again, proper ACS features/control eliminates this need.
A (multi-function) device should never be able to perform
IO to itself via its PCIe interface.  Bridge-ACS pushes everything
up to SMMU for desitination resolution.
Without ACS, I don't see how a guest is migratible from one system to
another, unless the system-migration-group consists of system that
are exactly the same (wrt IO) [less/more system memory &/or cpu does
not affect VM system map.
  
Again, the initial Linux implementation did not have ACS,
but was 'resolved' by the default/common system mapping putting the PCI devices
into an area that was blocked from memory use (generally 3G->4G space).
ARM may not have that single, simple implementation, but a method to
indicated reserved regions, and then a check for matching/non-matching reserved
regions for guest migration, is the only way I see to resolve this issue
until ACS is sufficiently supported int the hw subsystems to be used
for device-assignment.

> Rather than treat these as separate problems, a better interface is to
> tell userspace about a set of reserved regions, and have this include
> the MSI doorbell, irrespective of whether or not it can be remapped.
> Don suggested that we statically pick an address for the doorbell in a
> similar way to x86, and have the kernel map it there. We could even pick
> 0xfee00000.
I suggest picking a 'relative-fixed' address: the last n-pages of system memory
address space, i.e.,
    0xfff[....]fee00000.   ... sign-extended 0xfee00000.
That way, no matter how large memory is, there is no hole, it's just the
last 2M of memory ... every system has an end of memory. :-p

> If it conflicts with a reserved region on the platform (due
>to (4)), then we'd obviously have to (deterministically?) allocate it
> somewhere else, but probably within the bottom 4G.
>
why? It's more likely for a hw platform to use this <4G address range
for device mmio, then the upper-most address space for device space.  Even if
platforms use upper-most address space now, it's not rocket science to subtract
upper 2M from existing use, then allocate device space from there (downward).
... and if you pull a 'there are systems that have hard-wired addresses
in upper-most 2M', then we can look at if we can quirk these systems, or
just not support them for this use-case.

> The next question is how to tell userspace about all of the reserved
> regions. Initially, the idea was to extend VFIO, however Alex pointed
Won't need to, if upper memory space is passed; take upper 2M and done. ;-)
For now, you'll need a whole new qemu paradigm, for a (hopefully) short-term
problem. I suggest coming up with a short-term, default 'safe' place for
devices & memory to avoid the qemu disruption.

> out a horrible scenario:
>
>    1. QEMU spawns a VM on system 0
>    2. VM is migrated to system 1
>    3. QEMU attempts to passthrough a device using PCI hotplug
>
> In this scenario, the guest memory map is chosen at step (1), yet there
> is no VFIO fd available to determine the reserved regions. Furthermore,
> the reserved regions may vary between system 0 and system 1. This pretty
> much rules out using VFIO to determine the reserved regions. Alex suggested
> that the SMMU driver can advertise the regions via /sys/class/iommu/. This
> would solve part of the problem, but migration between systems with
> different memory maps can still cause problems if the reserved regions
> of the new system conflict with the guest memory map chosen by QEMU.
> Jon pointed out that most people are pretty conservative about hardware
> choices when migrating between them -- that is, they may only migrate
> between different revisions of the same SoC, or they know ahead of time
> all of the memory maps they want to support and this could be communicated
> by way of configuration to libvirt. It would be up to QEMU to fail the
> hotplug if it detected a conflict. Alex asked if there was a security
> issue with DMA bypassing the SMMU, but there aren't currently any systems
> where that is known to happen. Such a system would surely not be safe for
> passthrough.
>
> Ben mused that a way to handle conflicts dynamically might be to hotplug
> on the entire host bridge in the guest, passing firmware tables describing
> the new reserved regions as a property of the host bridge. Whilst this
> may well solve the issue, it was largely considered future work due to
> its invasive nature and dependency on firmware tables (and guest support)
> that do not currently exist.
>
> Will
>